Version: 4 (current) | Updated: 11/13/2025, 6:19:34 AM
Added description
The piece also references the World Bank’s praise of China’s “immense wealth of human talent, effort and discipline” and situates the 1983 data within the larger trend of rapid economic liberalisation that followed Maoist rule.
**Metadata and publications**
@adam_tooze:person {full_name: "Adam Tooze", occupation: "historian"}
@chartbook_28:document {title: "Adam Tooze's Chartbook #28: China in 1983, a miracle waiting to happen?", creator: @adam_tooze, created: @date_2021_07_24, type: "newsletter"}
@world_bank_report_1983:document {title: "The Economy, Statistical System and Basic Data – China’s Socialist Economic Development (1983)", publisher: @world_bank, year: @date_1983}
@chartbook_30:document {title: "Adam Tooze's Chartbook #30: Back to Afghanistan – the horror of the 1980s and the long recovery", creator: @adam_tooze, created: @date_2021_08_04, type: "newsletter"}
**Key persons and officials**
@alexander_eckstein:person {occupation: "economist", affiliation: "University of Michigan"}
@hsiang_hsi_kung:person {full_name: "Hsiang‑Hsi “H.H.” “Daddy” K’ung", role: "Governor of the Central Bank of China (1933‑1945)"}
@hamid_karzai:person {full_name: "Hamid Karzai", role: "Interim President of Afghanistan (2001‑2004)"}
@ashraf_ghani:person {full_name: "Ashraf Ghani", role: "Afghan Minister of Finance (2002‑2004)"}
@mohammad_karzai:person {full_name: "Mahmoud Karzai", role: "Brother of Hamid Karzai, businessman"}
@sherkhan_farnood:person {full_name: "Sherkhan Farnood", role: "Founder of Shaheen Exchange and Kabul Bank"}
@marek_sliwinski:person {full_name: "Marek Sliwinski", occupation: "demographer"}
@noor_ahmad_khalidi:person {full_name: "Noor Ahmad Khalidi", occupation: "demographer"}
**Organizations and institutions**
@world_bank:organization {type: "multilateral development bank"}
@imf:organization {type: "International Monetary Fund"}
@usaid:organization {type: "U.S. Agency for International Development"}
@dab:organization {full_name: "Da Afghanistan Bank", type: "central bank"}
@isaf:organization {full_name: "International Security Assistance Force"}
@gallup_pakistan:organization {type: "survey firm"}
@afghan_first:concept {description: "U.S. procurement policy requiring purchases from Afghan firms"}
@kabul_bank:organization {type: "commercial bank"}
@shaheen_exchange:organization {type: "money‑service provider"}
@afghan_reconstruction_trust_fund:organization {type: "on‑budget trust fund"}
**Key events and agreements**
@bonn_agreement:document {title: "Bonn Agreement", date: @date_2001_12_05, outcome: "Installed Hamid Karzai as interim head of Afghanistan"}
@isaf_established:event {date: @date_2001_12_20, initiator: @united_states, result: @isaf}
@china_join_imf:event {date: @date_1980, actor: @china, target: @imf}
@china_join_world_bank:event {date: @date_1980, actor: @china, target: @world_bank}
@afghan_war_1980s:event {period: @date_1979_1989, parties: [@soviet_union, @afghanistan, @mujahedeen], description: "Soviet‑Afghan war and associated civilian casualties"}
@kabul_bank_collapse:event {date: @date_2010, actor: @kabul_bank, impact: "Banking crisis, $825 million bailout"}
**Economic and demographic data (illustrative relationships)**
@world_bank_report_1983 -> authored_by -> @world_bank
@world_bank_report_1983 -> used_data_from -> @alexander_eckstein {topic: "early 1950s Chinese economy"}
@china -> had_life_expectancy {from: @date_1950, to: @date_1979, years: 36 → 64}
@china -> industrialized_without_urbanizing {urban_share_1950: 10.6 %, urban_share_1957: 15.4 %}
@china -> implemented_demographic_policy {start: @date_1965, peak_growth_rate: 2.8 %/yr, reduced_to: 1.2 %/yr}
@afghanistan -> experienced_demographic_collapse {period: @date_1980s, estimated_deaths: 1250000, source: @marek_sliwinski}
@afghanistan -> experienced_demographic_collapse {period: @date_1980s, estimated_deaths: 876825, source: @noor_ahmad_khalidi}
@afghanistan -> had_agricultural_productivity {per_capita_grain_equivalents_1979: "27 % higher than India"}
@afghanistan -> urban_share {year: @date_1957, percent: 10.6}
@afghanistan -> urban_share {year: @date_1957, percent: 15.4, peak: true}
@afghanistan -> joined_imf -> @date_1980
@afghanistan -> joined_world_bank -> @date_1980
**Currency reforms**
@dab -> introduced_currency -> @afghan_afghani:currency {date: @date_2002_09_04, exchange_rate: "AFN 1.303 per AFA 1000"}
**Refugee and casualty data collection**
@gallup_pakistan -> surveyed -> @afghan_refugee_camps {year: @date_1980s}
@afghan_refugee_camps -> reported_casualties -> @afghanistan {estimated_deaths: 1250000, source: @marek_sliwinski}
**U.S. policy and programs**
@usaid -> created_program -> @afghan_first {description: "Procurement from Afghan firms"}
@usaid -> launched -> @afghan_reconstruction_trust_fund {date: @date_2002_05, purpose: "Channel on‑budget aid"}
@usaid -> funded -> @kabul_bank_collapse {year: @date_2010, amount: "$825 million"}
**International aid and financing**
@world_bank -> estimated_reconstruction_needs_2001 {amount: "$14.6 billion", horizon: "10 years"}
@world_bank -> praised -> @china {quote: "immense wealth of human talent, effort and discipline"}
**Afghan political milestones**
@hamid_karzai -> appointed_interim_head -> @bonn_agreement {date: @date_2001_12_05}
@isaf -> assumed_control -> @afghanistan {date: @date_2003_08_08, scope: "nation‑wide security"}
**Mining and extractive sector (selected highlights)**
@afghanistan -> awarded_mining_concession -> @metallurgical_group_corporation_china {project: "Mes Aynak copper", year: @date_2008}
@afghanistan -> projected_mining_revenue {2020: "$650 million/yr", 2025: "$1.7 billion/yr"}
**Telecommunications development**
@usaid -> supported -> @telecom_sector {projects: ["satellite earth station", "fiber‑optic ring"], years: @date_2003_2006}
**Key dates referenced**
@date_2021_07_24, @date_2021_08_04, @date_1983, @date_1979, @date_1979_1989, @date_2001_12_05, @date_2001_12_20, @date_2002_05, @date_2002_09_04, @date_2003_08_08, @date_2008, @date_2010, @date_2016, @date_2020, @date_2021, @date_2022, @date_2023, @date_2024, @date_2025.<!--
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"post_id": "39119749.adam-toozes-chartbook-28-china-in",
"post_date": "2021-07-24T14:37:51.311Z",
"is_published": true,
"email_sent_at": "2021-07-24T14:37:51.339Z",
"inbox_sent_at": "2021-07-24T14:37:51.339Z",
"type": "newsletter",
"audience": "everyone",
"title": "Adam Tooze's Chartbook #28: China in 1983, a miracle waiting to happen?",
"subtitle": "The World Bank's first report on Socialist Economic Development "
}
-->
<p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{"url":"https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?","text":"Subscribe now","action":null,"class":null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>Chartbook #28 accompanies the cover story I did for the latest issue of the <em>New Statesman </em>on China’s twentieth century history. The New Statesman piece is a bit of a high-wire act suspended btw J.A Hobson and Larry Summers. Check it out <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/international/places/2021/07/why-there-no-solution-our-age-crisis-without-china">here</a>. </p><p>One of the most intriguing things I read whilst researching the piece, was the World Bank’s report on <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/192611468769173749/the-economy-statistical-system-and-basic-data">China’s </a><em><a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/192611468769173749/the-economy-statistical-system-and-basic-data">Socialist Economic Development </a></em><a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/192611468769173749/the-economy-statistical-system-and-basic-data">from 1983</a>. What is so fascinating is that this was the first time that the World Bank had the chance to do an in-depth analysis of China’s development under Communism. The report asks all the questions one might be tempted to ask at that point. Where was China at after the end of Maoism? What distinguished it from other low-income Asian giants like India or Pakistan or Indonesia. Was China about to take off? </p><p>Before we get into that, a brief note on <em>Chartbook</em> and how you can contribute to its future.</p><p>**********</p><p><em>Chartbook</em> started as a free newsletter and I want very much to keep it that way. If you need to read <em>Chartbook Newsletter</em> for free, you are welcome to do so. If you can’t afford a paid subscription, or if you read it in a context where paying subscriptions is inappropriate, I get it. You don’t have to do anything. You will continue to receive the newsletter as before. </p><p>But, writing the newsletter takes a lot of time and effort. I have to juggle it with all sorts of other commitments. So, if you can afford to, if you think the <em>Chartbook </em>content is valuable, if you would like to support the mission, or, simply, to buy me the equivalent of a cup of coffee once a month, please click here:</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{"url":"https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?","text":"Subscribe now","action":null,"class":null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>There are three options:</p><ol><li><p>The <strong>annual subscription: $50 annually</strong></p></li><li><p>The <strong>standard monthly subscription: $5 monthly -</strong> which gives you a bit more flexibility.</p></li><li><p><strong>Founders club:</strong> <strong>$ 120 annua</strong>lly, or another amount at your discretion - for those who really love Chartbook Newsletter, or read it in a professional setting in which you regularly pay for subscriptions, please consider signing up for the <strong>Founders Club</strong>. </p></li></ol><p>What do you get in return? First and foremost, good karma. In addition, for paying subscribers I have started a series of regular emails featuring the most interesting, engaging or simply weird links I have come across over the previous few days. Check out Top Links <a href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-top-links-1">#1</a> and <a href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/top-links-2-reading-suggestions-from">#2</a>. More to come. </p><p>With the release of <em>Shutdown</em> on September 7, there are more goodies on the way. The highlight will be Shutdown reading group sessions for paying subscribers. Details tba. To be on the invite list, sign up for one of the subscription options here:</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{"url":"https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?","text":"Subscribe now","action":null,"class":null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>Now, down to business.</p><p>********</p><p>In 1980 China joined, or in Beijing’s words, “resumed its lawful seats” at the IMF and the World Bank, aka “the Bretton Woods institutions”. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kGQo!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a62f360-de33-4266-a607-1a5094ab6352_1236x796.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kGQo!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a62f360-de33-4266-a607-1a5094ab6352_1236x796.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kGQo!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a62f360-de33-4266-a607-1a5094ab6352_1236x796.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kGQo!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a62f360-de33-4266-a607-1a5094ab6352_1236x796.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kGQo!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a62f360-de33-4266-a607-1a5094ab6352_1236x796.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/0a62f360-de33-4266-a607-1a5094ab6352_1236x796.png" width="586" height="377.3915857605178" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/0a62f360-de33-4266-a607-1a5094ab6352_1236x796.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":796,"width":1236,"resizeWidth":586,"bytes":439466,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kGQo!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a62f360-de33-4266-a607-1a5094ab6352_1236x796.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kGQo!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a62f360-de33-4266-a607-1a5094ab6352_1236x796.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kGQo!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a62f360-de33-4266-a607-1a5094ab6352_1236x796.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kGQo!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a62f360-de33-4266-a607-1a5094ab6352_1236x796.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Source: <a href="https://www.boc.cn/en/aboutboc/ab7/200809/t20080926_1601847.html">BOC</a></p><p>It is too easily forgotten but as a major contributor to the World War II alliance, China’s nationalist government was very much part of the postwar financial negotiations that took place in the summer of 1944 at the Bretton Woods hotel in New Hampshire. The Nationalist regime was represented at the conference by a large and expert <a href="http://www.centerforfinancialstability.org/bw/Who_Was_at_Bretton_Woods.pdf">delegation</a> headed by Hsiang-Hsi “H.H.” “Daddy” K’ung (1881-1967) governor of the central bank between 1933 and 1945.</p><p>When contacts resumed in the late 1970s the going was surprisingly easy. The politics of the encounter were fascinating. To read more about that check out Julian Gewirtz’s <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674971134">Unlikely Partners</a>, a fascinating history of Western economics in reform-era China. I want to focus here on the report itself and the picture it gives us of China’s situation before the growth explosion.</p><p>To start the story what was needed was a benchmark. What state was China in, when the Communists took over? The data used by the World Bank were produced by Michigan scholar <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Eckstein">Alexander Eckstein</a>. The answer was stark. In the early 1950s, Communist China and India at independence were in a broadly similar place. Both were barely above subsistence. India’s per capita GDP was slightly ahead, as was its level of industrialization. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_SDo!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F957a1d1d-7e33-4a2d-9ea3-ef92bcc84f10_1484x726.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_SDo!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F957a1d1d-7e33-4a2d-9ea3-ef92bcc84f10_1484x726.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_SDo!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F957a1d1d-7e33-4a2d-9ea3-ef92bcc84f10_1484x726.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_SDo!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F957a1d1d-7e33-4a2d-9ea3-ef92bcc84f10_1484x726.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_SDo!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F957a1d1d-7e33-4a2d-9ea3-ef92bcc84f10_1484x726.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/957a1d1d-7e33-4a2d-9ea3-ef92bcc84f10_1484x726.png" width="1456" height="712" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/957a1d1d-7e33-4a2d-9ea3-ef92bcc84f10_1484x726.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":712,"width":1456,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":140392,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_SDo!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F957a1d1d-7e33-4a2d-9ea3-ef92bcc84f10_1484x726.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_SDo!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F957a1d1d-7e33-4a2d-9ea3-ef92bcc84f10_1484x726.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_SDo!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F957a1d1d-7e33-4a2d-9ea3-ef92bcc84f10_1484x726.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_SDo!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F957a1d1d-7e33-4a2d-9ea3-ef92bcc84f10_1484x726.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The authoritative estimates of PPP GDP per capita compiled by Angus Maddison decades later agree with Eckstein’s as far as India and China are concerned. </p><p>If the starting point in the early 1950s, was one of poverty and underdevelopment. Three decades later, what kind of society had the Communist regime made? </p><p>The World Bank did not hide the fact that there had been disasters. The terrible impact of the Great Leap Forward screamed out of the demographic data. Huge swings in mortality and fertility were visible in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In a society of China’s scale, such fluctuations can only be the result of epic catastrophe. </p><p>Visible too was the impact of the cultural revolution. In 1964 685,000 young people were enrolled at Universities in China. In 1968 that plunged to 259,000 and in 1970 to 48,000. As the World Bank noted in a fascinating annexe on the history of China’s statistical infrastructure, in 1968 China’s statistical offices were shut down. The office reopened in 1971 but ten years later it was still chronically understaffed. </p><p>What was clear from the basic GDP data were two things. First, China in 1979 was still a very poor society ($1039 1990s dollars per capita per annum according to Maddison). Second, it had pulled ahead of India. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!VReM!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb8d1ada7-e670-4bda-b9eb-6a493138edac_956x590.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!VReM!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb8d1ada7-e670-4bda-b9eb-6a493138edac_956x590.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!VReM!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb8d1ada7-e670-4bda-b9eb-6a493138edac_956x590.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!VReM!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb8d1ada7-e670-4bda-b9eb-6a493138edac_956x590.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!VReM!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb8d1ada7-e670-4bda-b9eb-6a493138edac_956x590.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/b8d1ada7-e670-4bda-b9eb-6a493138edac_956x590.png" width="560" height="345.60669456066944" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/b8d1ada7-e670-4bda-b9eb-6a493138edac_956x590.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":590,"width":956,"resizeWidth":560,"bytes":99474,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!VReM!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb8d1ada7-e670-4bda-b9eb-6a493138edac_956x590.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!VReM!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb8d1ada7-e670-4bda-b9eb-6a493138edac_956x590.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!VReM!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb8d1ada7-e670-4bda-b9eb-6a493138edac_956x590.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!VReM!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb8d1ada7-e670-4bda-b9eb-6a493138edac_956x590.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Strikingly, though income had doubled relative to 1950 and though population had practically doubled too, China had not urbanized. In 1949 the city and town population had accounted for 10.6% of the population. The urban share peaked at 15.4% in 1957. After that the share declined to 12 and 13 percent in the 1970s. That compared to more than 20 percent in India. The low urban share was all the more striking because in terms of the weight of its economy, China was considerably more industrialized than its low income peers. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4cxf!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F138f6200-c942-4bac-b289-a21055152b09_1244x508.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4cxf!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F138f6200-c942-4bac-b289-a21055152b09_1244x508.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4cxf!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F138f6200-c942-4bac-b289-a21055152b09_1244x508.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4cxf!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F138f6200-c942-4bac-b289-a21055152b09_1244x508.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4cxf!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F138f6200-c942-4bac-b289-a21055152b09_1244x508.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/138f6200-c942-4bac-b289-a21055152b09_1244x508.png" width="1244" height="508" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/138f6200-c942-4bac-b289-a21055152b09_1244x508.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":508,"width":1244,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":88954,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4cxf!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F138f6200-c942-4bac-b289-a21055152b09_1244x508.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4cxf!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F138f6200-c942-4bac-b289-a21055152b09_1244x508.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4cxf!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F138f6200-c942-4bac-b289-a21055152b09_1244x508.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4cxf!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F138f6200-c942-4bac-b289-a21055152b09_1244x508.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>China had industrialized without urbanizing. This is confirmed by other material indicators such as China’s electricity consumption, which surged. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9hg!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94dd1fd0-338d-4dc1-a1a3-5de49a67926b_942x716.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9hg!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94dd1fd0-338d-4dc1-a1a3-5de49a67926b_942x716.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9hg!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94dd1fd0-338d-4dc1-a1a3-5de49a67926b_942x716.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9hg!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94dd1fd0-338d-4dc1-a1a3-5de49a67926b_942x716.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9hg!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94dd1fd0-338d-4dc1-a1a3-5de49a67926b_942x716.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/94dd1fd0-338d-4dc1-a1a3-5de49a67926b_942x716.png" width="616" height="468.2123142250531" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/94dd1fd0-338d-4dc1-a1a3-5de49a67926b_942x716.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":716,"width":942,"resizeWidth":616,"bytes":108345,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9hg!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94dd1fd0-338d-4dc1-a1a3-5de49a67926b_942x716.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9hg!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94dd1fd0-338d-4dc1-a1a3-5de49a67926b_942x716.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9hg!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94dd1fd0-338d-4dc1-a1a3-5de49a67926b_942x716.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9hg!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F94dd1fd0-338d-4dc1-a1a3-5de49a67926b_942x716.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p> In terms of per capita energy consumption, by the 1970s China was already well ahead of other low-income countries. In 1979, per capita its energy consumption in China was three times that India. China had a huge coal industry. It was also, it is all too easily forgotten, a major producer and exporter of oil. More on this in another post. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rju4!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F20f01b7a-b3e6-4c2e-948b-1cfa8a692d8b_1210x598.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rju4!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F20f01b7a-b3e6-4c2e-948b-1cfa8a692d8b_1210x598.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rju4!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F20f01b7a-b3e6-4c2e-948b-1cfa8a692d8b_1210x598.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rju4!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F20f01b7a-b3e6-4c2e-948b-1cfa8a692d8b_1210x598.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rju4!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F20f01b7a-b3e6-4c2e-948b-1cfa8a692d8b_1210x598.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/20f01b7a-b3e6-4c2e-948b-1cfa8a692d8b_1210x598.png" width="1210" height="598" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/20f01b7a-b3e6-4c2e-948b-1cfa8a692d8b_1210x598.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":598,"width":1210,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":94075,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rju4!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F20f01b7a-b3e6-4c2e-948b-1cfa8a692d8b_1210x598.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rju4!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F20f01b7a-b3e6-4c2e-948b-1cfa8a692d8b_1210x598.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rju4!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F20f01b7a-b3e6-4c2e-948b-1cfa8a692d8b_1210x598.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rju4!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F20f01b7a-b3e6-4c2e-948b-1cfa8a692d8b_1210x598.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Industrializing without urbanizing was remarkable, but it was not the unevenness of China’s development that most impressed the World Bank investigators. What struck them was that the Communist regime had laid the foundations for growth by delivering basic services to its population. </p><p>"China's most remarkable achievement during the past three decades", the Bank remarked, was to have made "low-income groups far better off in terms of basic needs than their counterparts in most other poor countries". As a result, the most basic indicator of human well-being, life expectancy had surged in China from 36 in 1950 to 64 in 1979. In 1979 China, the most populous country on the planet and one of the poorest, had an average life expectancy that put in the higher tier of middle-income countries. In Shanghai China’s richest province, average life expectancy in the late 1970s was 72 years, no more than a year behind that in the UK at the time. Overall life expectancy, at 64 years was in the words of the World Bank "outstandingly high for a country at China's per capita income level". </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O7M0!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a41147f-c578-42df-b194-a43e80b2247f_944x492.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O7M0!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a41147f-c578-42df-b194-a43e80b2247f_944x492.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O7M0!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a41147f-c578-42df-b194-a43e80b2247f_944x492.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O7M0!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a41147f-c578-42df-b194-a43e80b2247f_944x492.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O7M0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a41147f-c578-42df-b194-a43e80b2247f_944x492.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/0a41147f-c578-42df-b194-a43e80b2247f_944x492.png" width="632" height="329.3898305084746" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/0a41147f-c578-42df-b194-a43e80b2247f_944x492.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":492,"width":944,"resizeWidth":632,"bytes":70537,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O7M0!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a41147f-c578-42df-b194-a43e80b2247f_944x492.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O7M0!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a41147f-c578-42df-b194-a43e80b2247f_944x492.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O7M0!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a41147f-c578-42df-b194-a43e80b2247f_944x492.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O7M0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a41147f-c578-42df-b194-a43e80b2247f_944x492.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>NB: The figure for China was chosen as 1957, presumably because the demographic data for 1960 were under the shadow of the Great Leap Forward. </p><p>Life expectancy reflects an entire complex of factors, but the World Bank did not hesitate in its interpretation. In its view it was due to the fact that unlike other low-income countries - notably India since independence - the Communist regime in China had secured a basic provision of food, health care and education for practically everyone. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!C_Sx!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d8f0ca7-c0f5-46ec-85e8-a996e83b9d84_1868x522.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!C_Sx!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d8f0ca7-c0f5-46ec-85e8-a996e83b9d84_1868x522.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!C_Sx!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d8f0ca7-c0f5-46ec-85e8-a996e83b9d84_1868x522.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!C_Sx!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d8f0ca7-c0f5-46ec-85e8-a996e83b9d84_1868x522.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!C_Sx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d8f0ca7-c0f5-46ec-85e8-a996e83b9d84_1868x522.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/7d8f0ca7-c0f5-46ec-85e8-a996e83b9d84_1868x522.png" width="1456" height="407" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/7d8f0ca7-c0f5-46ec-85e8-a996e83b9d84_1868x522.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":407,"width":1456,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":122013,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!C_Sx!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d8f0ca7-c0f5-46ec-85e8-a996e83b9d84_1868x522.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!C_Sx!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d8f0ca7-c0f5-46ec-85e8-a996e83b9d84_1868x522.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!C_Sx!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d8f0ca7-c0f5-46ec-85e8-a996e83b9d84_1868x522.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!C_Sx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d8f0ca7-c0f5-46ec-85e8-a996e83b9d84_1868x522.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>China’s superior nutritional level reflected the more advanced state of its agriculture. Reduced to a common denominator of grain-equivalents the World Bank estimated that China’s agricultural production per capita was 27 percent higher than that of India in 1979. The endowment of Chinese agriculture with farm machinery and the use of fertilizer was far greater than in India. Yields per hectare were higher, as was historically the case. </p><p>The World Bank’s statistics painted the picture of a Chinese agricultural economy that used a high intensity of industrial inputs to produce superior yields per hectare compared to most low-income countries. It was clearly not optimal - the entire complex history of agriculture under Communism said otherwise - but, it was enough to ensure adequate food availability.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dqpV!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F30b25e67-79f4-4d2e-9371-3beaf8aadef6_1892x612.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dqpV!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F30b25e67-79f4-4d2e-9371-3beaf8aadef6_1892x612.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dqpV!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F30b25e67-79f4-4d2e-9371-3beaf8aadef6_1892x612.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dqpV!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F30b25e67-79f4-4d2e-9371-3beaf8aadef6_1892x612.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dqpV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F30b25e67-79f4-4d2e-9371-3beaf8aadef6_1892x612.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/30b25e67-79f4-4d2e-9371-3beaf8aadef6_1892x612.png" width="1456" height="471" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/30b25e67-79f4-4d2e-9371-3beaf8aadef6_1892x612.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":471,"width":1456,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":131785,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dqpV!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F30b25e67-79f4-4d2e-9371-3beaf8aadef6_1892x612.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dqpV!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F30b25e67-79f4-4d2e-9371-3beaf8aadef6_1892x612.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dqpV!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F30b25e67-79f4-4d2e-9371-3beaf8aadef6_1892x612.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dqpV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F30b25e67-79f4-4d2e-9371-3beaf8aadef6_1892x612.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Though Chinese farms were equipped with more modern equipment than their Indian counterparts, that did not reflect any special priority accorded to agricultural investment. On the contrary, given agriculture’s share of production and employment, it was drastically starved of new investment. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!wdNq!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333621c8-ac86-490a-a2e2-870f75c7b642_1250x488.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!wdNq!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333621c8-ac86-490a-a2e2-870f75c7b642_1250x488.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!wdNq!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333621c8-ac86-490a-a2e2-870f75c7b642_1250x488.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!wdNq!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333621c8-ac86-490a-a2e2-870f75c7b642_1250x488.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!wdNq!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333621c8-ac86-490a-a2e2-870f75c7b642_1250x488.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/333621c8-ac86-490a-a2e2-870f75c7b642_1250x488.png" width="1250" height="488" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/333621c8-ac86-490a-a2e2-870f75c7b642_1250x488.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":488,"width":1250,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":96762,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!wdNq!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333621c8-ac86-490a-a2e2-870f75c7b642_1250x488.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!wdNq!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333621c8-ac86-490a-a2e2-870f75c7b642_1250x488.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!wdNq!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333621c8-ac86-490a-a2e2-870f75c7b642_1250x488.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!wdNq!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333621c8-ac86-490a-a2e2-870f75c7b642_1250x488.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>It was not high spending on rural development, that secured the far better outcomes for the mass of China’s population but the comprehensive organization of social services and the priority given to food distribution, education and health . </p><p>Mao’s Marxism was distinctive in its focus on the peasantry. But viewed in terms of income distribution it was in the city rather than the countryside that the redistributive quality of China’s regime was most evident. Whereas the cities of other poor countries were places of extreme inequality, China’s cities in the Mao and immediate post-Mao era were places of relative equality. In China, the gini measure of inequality was lower in the city than in the countryside, in India the reverse was true. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G-nx!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F67a57f81-1322-4f28-973d-f5e849140d99_1040x560.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G-nx!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F67a57f81-1322-4f28-973d-f5e849140d99_1040x560.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G-nx!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F67a57f81-1322-4f28-973d-f5e849140d99_1040x560.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G-nx!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F67a57f81-1322-4f28-973d-f5e849140d99_1040x560.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G-nx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F67a57f81-1322-4f28-973d-f5e849140d99_1040x560.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/67a57f81-1322-4f28-973d-f5e849140d99_1040x560.png" width="1040" height="560" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/67a57f81-1322-4f28-973d-f5e849140d99_1040x560.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":560,"width":1040,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":87777,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G-nx!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F67a57f81-1322-4f28-973d-f5e849140d99_1040x560.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G-nx!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F67a57f81-1322-4f28-973d-f5e849140d99_1040x560.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G-nx!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F67a57f81-1322-4f28-973d-f5e849140d99_1040x560.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G-nx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F67a57f81-1322-4f28-973d-f5e849140d99_1040x560.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Meanwhile, China’s fiercely invasive demographic policy had arrested population growth and was delivering a huge demographic dividend. In the 1960s China had faced a run away population explosion. In 1965 the growth rate hit 2.8 percent per annum. The regime’s demographic policy brought that to an abrupt halt. The rate of natural increase (the difference between the crude birth and death rates) plunged to 1.2 percent. As a result, China had a demographic profile more like that of an industrialized country than a low-income country. Both its crude birth and death rates were like those of industrialized countries. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CuZg!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff34ac84a-56bf-40f8-b8ff-977eed4deb24_994x592.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CuZg!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff34ac84a-56bf-40f8-b8ff-977eed4deb24_994x592.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CuZg!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff34ac84a-56bf-40f8-b8ff-977eed4deb24_994x592.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CuZg!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff34ac84a-56bf-40f8-b8ff-977eed4deb24_994x592.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CuZg!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff34ac84a-56bf-40f8-b8ff-977eed4deb24_994x592.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/f34ac84a-56bf-40f8-b8ff-977eed4deb24_994x592.png" width="994" height="592" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/f34ac84a-56bf-40f8-b8ff-977eed4deb24_994x592.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":592,"width":994,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":83769,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CuZg!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff34ac84a-56bf-40f8-b8ff-977eed4deb24_994x592.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CuZg!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff34ac84a-56bf-40f8-b8ff-977eed4deb24_994x592.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CuZg!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff34ac84a-56bf-40f8-b8ff-977eed4deb24_994x592.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CuZg!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff34ac84a-56bf-40f8-b8ff-977eed4deb24_994x592.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The basic logic of the demographic policy was to enable resources to be concentrated in educating children. By 1970s China’s advantage in terms of basic school education relative to other low income countries was already very striking. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jcwi!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd1bf411d-5b9b-4e58-a744-87eb935ed9a5_966x662.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jcwi!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd1bf411d-5b9b-4e58-a744-87eb935ed9a5_966x662.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jcwi!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd1bf411d-5b9b-4e58-a744-87eb935ed9a5_966x662.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jcwi!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd1bf411d-5b9b-4e58-a744-87eb935ed9a5_966x662.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jcwi!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd1bf411d-5b9b-4e58-a744-87eb935ed9a5_966x662.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/d1bf411d-5b9b-4e58-a744-87eb935ed9a5_966x662.png" width="966" height="662" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/d1bf411d-5b9b-4e58-a744-87eb935ed9a5_966x662.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":662,"width":966,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":93268,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jcwi!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd1bf411d-5b9b-4e58-a744-87eb935ed9a5_966x662.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jcwi!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd1bf411d-5b9b-4e58-a744-87eb935ed9a5_966x662.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jcwi!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd1bf411d-5b9b-4e58-a744-87eb935ed9a5_966x662.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jcwi!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd1bf411d-5b9b-4e58-a744-87eb935ed9a5_966x662.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>All in all, the World Bank’s report was glowing. It is perhaps surprising, but in the heyday of neoliberalism, the World Bank, soon to become notorious as an agent of the Washington consensus, had little but praise not just for the new phase of reform, but for the legacy of the Maoist period. One might be tempted to dismiss this simply as kowtowing to an important new member state. Beijing would hardly react well to a more critical report. But there is every sign that the World Bank economists believed in their basic diagnosis. Indeed, they gave hostages to fortune with their predictive summary. Provided the right policies could be put in place, the World Bank was convinced on the basis of its findings in the early 1980s that China's "immense wealth of human talent, effort and discipline" would enable it "within a generation or so, to achieve a tremendous increase in the living standards of its people". If there was ever a prediction born out by history, this is it. </p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{"url":"https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?","text":"Subscribe now","action":null,"class":null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><!--
{
"post_id": "39523172.adam-toozes-chartbook-30-back-to",
"post_date": "2021-08-04T11:13:21.402Z",
"is_published": true,
"email_sent_at": "2021-08-04T11:13:21.435Z",
"inbox_sent_at": "2021-08-04T11:13:21.435Z",
"type": "newsletter",
"audience": "everyone",
"title": "Adam Tooze's Chartbook #30: Back to Afghanistan - the horror of the 1980s and the long recovery",
"subtitle": "Afghanistan, the graveyard of demography"
}
-->
<p>Doing the first Afghanistan report - Chartbook #29 - has rocked my world a little bit. I did not appreciate how complex and ambiguous was the modernization of Afghanistan’s economy and society since 2001. Nor did I appreciate the scale of the 1980s devastation. It is very rare for modern societies with an established pattern of population growth to experience a sudden and prolonged reversal. This points to a disaster of truly enormous proportions. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TheI!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F61e276fd-472c-4e4b-b8b7-050098eaf8c4_1520x984.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TheI!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F61e276fd-472c-4e4b-b8b7-050098eaf8c4_1520x984.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TheI!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F61e276fd-472c-4e4b-b8b7-050098eaf8c4_1520x984.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TheI!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F61e276fd-472c-4e4b-b8b7-050098eaf8c4_1520x984.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TheI!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F61e276fd-472c-4e4b-b8b7-050098eaf8c4_1520x984.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/61e276fd-472c-4e4b-b8b7-050098eaf8c4_1520x984.png" width="1456" height="943" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/61e276fd-472c-4e4b-b8b7-050098eaf8c4_1520x984.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":943,"width":1456,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":2519130,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":false,"topImage":true,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TheI!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F61e276fd-472c-4e4b-b8b7-050098eaf8c4_1520x984.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TheI!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F61e276fd-472c-4e4b-b8b7-050098eaf8c4_1520x984.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TheI!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F61e276fd-472c-4e4b-b8b7-050098eaf8c4_1520x984.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TheI!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F61e276fd-472c-4e4b-b8b7-050098eaf8c4_1520x984.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{"url":"https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?","text":"Subscribe now","action":null,"class":null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>To drive home how anomalous was Afghanistan’s development, compare it to Iraq. Through the late 1970 they had similar populations on similar growth trajectories. They both fought major wars in the 1980s. But whereas the Iran-Iraq war remained largely confined to the battlefield and Saddam’s atrocities were restricted to the Kurdish and Shia areas, in Afghanistan the battle between the Soviet forces, the regime in Kabul and the resistance disrupted civil society and produced a dramatic demographic collapse. What explains that collapse? </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EIXI!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff7ea1259-a11f-486f-b4ca-e94b84cbbcf9_1246x698.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EIXI!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff7ea1259-a11f-486f-b4ca-e94b84cbbcf9_1246x698.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EIXI!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff7ea1259-a11f-486f-b4ca-e94b84cbbcf9_1246x698.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EIXI!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff7ea1259-a11f-486f-b4ca-e94b84cbbcf9_1246x698.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EIXI!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff7ea1259-a11f-486f-b4ca-e94b84cbbcf9_1246x698.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/f7ea1259-a11f-486f-b4ca-e94b84cbbcf9_1246x698.png" width="1246" height="698" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/f7ea1259-a11f-486f-b4ca-e94b84cbbcf9_1246x698.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":698,"width":1246,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":95445,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":false,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EIXI!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff7ea1259-a11f-486f-b4ca-e94b84cbbcf9_1246x698.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EIXI!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff7ea1259-a11f-486f-b4ca-e94b84cbbcf9_1246x698.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EIXI!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff7ea1259-a11f-486f-b4ca-e94b84cbbcf9_1246x698.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EIXI!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff7ea1259-a11f-486f-b4ca-e94b84cbbcf9_1246x698.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Before we attempt to answer that question, a brief note about <em>Chartbook</em>.</p><p>******</p><p>I enjoy putting <em>Chartbook</em> together. I hope you find it interesting. I know that Chartbook is read by folks in many different circumstances around the world. I am delighted that it goes out free to the majority of readers. </p><p>But, assembling all this material does take quite a bit of work. So, if you appreciate the Chartbook content and can afford to chip-in, please consider signing up for one of the paying subscriptions.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{"url":"https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?","text":"Subscribe now","action":null,"class":null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>There are three options:</p><ol><li><p>The <strong>annual subscription: $50 annually</strong></p></li><li><p>The <strong>standard monthly subscription: $5 monthly -</strong> which gives you a bit more flexibility.</p></li><li><p><strong>Founders club:$ 120 annua</strong>lly, or another amount at your discretion - for those who really love Chartbook Newsletter, or read it in a professional setting in which you regularly pay for subscriptions, please consider signing up for the <strong>Founders Club</strong>.</p></li></ol><p>A very big thank you to all those who have given their support to Chartbook. It is much appreciated. </p><p>********</p><p>Documenting what is happening in a society suffering such violence as dramatic as that in Afghanistan in the 1980s is far from easy. The story of how the demographic data were compiled is itself mind-blowing. Unable to conduct a census in Afghanistan itself, Gallup Pakistan was commissioned by a consortium of international backers to carry out a survey of Afghan families in 318 refugee camps. They reported the losses in their families and their villages. Those data were checked and then the percentage rate of casualties are applied to growth and death rates projected forwards from the census of 1979. </p><p>In his widely cited <a href="http://afghandata.org:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/azu/3246/azu_acku_pamphlet_ds371_2_s65_a34_1989_w.pdf">article</a> of 1989 - The Decimation of a People - Marek Sliwinski produced an estimate of total casualties amounting to 1.25 million or 9 percent of the prewar Afghan population. Based on the same refugee camp survey, but using a different population base, M. Siddiq Noorzoy estimated the number of persons killed to be as high as 1.7 million. But all these estimates depend on assumptions about the underlying population impacted by the war. Applying a more sophisticated demographic approach, in 1991 Noor Ahmad Khalidi revisited the estimates, breaking the population down into separate age slices. He arrived at a figure of 876,825 dead. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!940d!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F908ee3ba-18b9-403e-a6bc-dc1244734665_914x498.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!940d!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F908ee3ba-18b9-403e-a6bc-dc1244734665_914x498.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!940d!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F908ee3ba-18b9-403e-a6bc-dc1244734665_914x498.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!940d!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F908ee3ba-18b9-403e-a6bc-dc1244734665_914x498.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!940d!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F908ee3ba-18b9-403e-a6bc-dc1244734665_914x498.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/908ee3ba-18b9-403e-a6bc-dc1244734665_914x498.png" width="914" height="498" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/908ee3ba-18b9-403e-a6bc-dc1244734665_914x498.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":498,"width":914,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":122864,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!940d!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F908ee3ba-18b9-403e-a6bc-dc1244734665_914x498.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!940d!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F908ee3ba-18b9-403e-a6bc-dc1244734665_914x498.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!940d!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F908ee3ba-18b9-403e-a6bc-dc1244734665_914x498.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!940d!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F908ee3ba-18b9-403e-a6bc-dc1244734665_914x498.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634939108400750">Source: </a>Khalidi 1991</p><p>Any of these numbers signifies an epic shock. To err on the side of caution I have used Khalidi’s estimates in my tables. </p><p>Though there is disagreement about the total figures, there is no doubt about the relative balance of casualties. In the provinces closest to the border with the Soviet Union overall casualties may have amounted to a staggering 16 percent of prewar population.. The most heavy toll was taken of men of middle age. Sliwnski estimated that of all men between the age of 31 and 50, 22 percent did not survive the war. Those are rates of mortality typical of combat units, applied to an entire population cohort. It suggests that all Afghan men were effectively treated as combatants. </p><p>Between 1978 to 1981, the Soviets tried to clear a cordon sanitaire along the Pakistan border by depopulating it through aerial bombings. Amongst civilians, especially women, aerial bombing accounted for the largest number of casualties. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!PURR!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F077ad23b-ba6d-46d3-8ed5-5b2fe8654885_1196x360.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!PURR!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F077ad23b-ba6d-46d3-8ed5-5b2fe8654885_1196x360.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!PURR!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F077ad23b-ba6d-46d3-8ed5-5b2fe8654885_1196x360.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!PURR!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F077ad23b-ba6d-46d3-8ed5-5b2fe8654885_1196x360.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!PURR!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F077ad23b-ba6d-46d3-8ed5-5b2fe8654885_1196x360.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/077ad23b-ba6d-46d3-8ed5-5b2fe8654885_1196x360.png" width="1196" height="360" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/077ad23b-ba6d-46d3-8ed5-5b2fe8654885_1196x360.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":360,"width":1196,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":142986,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!PURR!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F077ad23b-ba6d-46d3-8ed5-5b2fe8654885_1196x360.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!PURR!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F077ad23b-ba6d-46d3-8ed5-5b2fe8654885_1196x360.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!PURR!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F077ad23b-ba6d-46d3-8ed5-5b2fe8654885_1196x360.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!PURR!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F077ad23b-ba6d-46d3-8ed5-5b2fe8654885_1196x360.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Source: <a href="http://afghandata.org:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/azu/3246/azu_acku_pamphlet_ds371_2_s65_a34_1989_w.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">Sliwinski</a></p><p>In 1982-4 the focus shifted to “clearing” the northern and central zone around Kabul. Then the focus shifted to control of trunk roads and railways, linking the central area to the Soviet Union. The overall impact was to depopulate the countryside and drive people either into the cities or into refugee camps. Sliwinski quotes officials in Kabul to the effect that "if only 1 million people were left in the country, they would be more than enough to start a new society." If we combine mass death, displacement and the movement of population within the country, the result is a truly staggering rearrangement of population.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LGYL!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffdd30d38-a7d8-4eec-93d1-d81c9236a065_1208x724.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LGYL!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffdd30d38-a7d8-4eec-93d1-d81c9236a065_1208x724.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LGYL!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffdd30d38-a7d8-4eec-93d1-d81c9236a065_1208x724.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LGYL!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffdd30d38-a7d8-4eec-93d1-d81c9236a065_1208x724.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LGYL!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffdd30d38-a7d8-4eec-93d1-d81c9236a065_1208x724.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/fdd30d38-a7d8-4eec-93d1-d81c9236a065_1208x724.png" width="1208" height="724" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/fdd30d38-a7d8-4eec-93d1-d81c9236a065_1208x724.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":724,"width":1208,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":160190,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LGYL!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffdd30d38-a7d8-4eec-93d1-d81c9236a065_1208x724.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LGYL!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffdd30d38-a7d8-4eec-93d1-d81c9236a065_1208x724.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LGYL!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffdd30d38-a7d8-4eec-93d1-d81c9236a065_1208x724.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LGYL!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffdd30d38-a7d8-4eec-93d1-d81c9236a065_1208x724.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Source: <a href="http://afghandata.org:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/azu/3246/azu_acku_pamphlet_ds371_2_s65_a34_1989_w.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">Sliwinski</a></p><p>The share of Afghans engaged as agriculturalist in their home villages fell from 85 percent in prewar Afghanistan to 23.2 percent by 1987. The urban population surged. Nine percent died as a result of the war. All told, at 43 percent, refugees, inside and outside Afghanistan, were the largest group of the population. Less than half the population were in settled rural or urban circumstances. Cambodia under Pol Pot, or Poland under Nazi occupation come to mind as societies which have experienced analogous levels of disruption. </p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{"url":"https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?","text":"Subscribe now","action":null,"class":null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>Even using Khalidi’s low estimates, the story is stark. The rate of war-related mortality surges in the 1980s and then falls sharply at the end of the war. Never again has Afghanistan experienced the intensity of destruction experienced in the 1980s. </p><p></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vj8b!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3fc5f2d-6091-4d2a-8318-e048d1ee00c8_938x566.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vj8b!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3fc5f2d-6091-4d2a-8318-e048d1ee00c8_938x566.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vj8b!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3fc5f2d-6091-4d2a-8318-e048d1ee00c8_938x566.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vj8b!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3fc5f2d-6091-4d2a-8318-e048d1ee00c8_938x566.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vj8b!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3fc5f2d-6091-4d2a-8318-e048d1ee00c8_938x566.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/c3fc5f2d-6091-4d2a-8318-e048d1ee00c8_938x566.png" width="938" height="566" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/c3fc5f2d-6091-4d2a-8318-e048d1ee00c8_938x566.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":566,"width":938,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":50089,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vj8b!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3fc5f2d-6091-4d2a-8318-e048d1ee00c8_938x566.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vj8b!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3fc5f2d-6091-4d2a-8318-e048d1ee00c8_938x566.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vj8b!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3fc5f2d-6091-4d2a-8318-e048d1ee00c8_938x566.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vj8b!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc3fc5f2d-6091-4d2a-8318-e048d1ee00c8_938x566.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The general failure to grasp how radical this break is, the sense that Afghanistan since 1978 has experienced a continuity of violence, is most likely explained by the fact that between 1992 and 1996 intense fighting spread to Kabul. A modern city in ruins provided graphic images. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IS-9!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc2d44b8f-6639-4bce-9265-b1ce9603d84d_1498x988.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IS-9!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc2d44b8f-6639-4bce-9265-b1ce9603d84d_1498x988.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IS-9!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc2d44b8f-6639-4bce-9265-b1ce9603d84d_1498x988.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IS-9!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc2d44b8f-6639-4bce-9265-b1ce9603d84d_1498x988.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IS-9!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc2d44b8f-6639-4bce-9265-b1ce9603d84d_1498x988.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/c2d44b8f-6639-4bce-9265-b1ce9603d84d_1498x988.png" width="1456" height="960" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/c2d44b8f-6639-4bce-9265-b1ce9603d84d_1498x988.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":960,"width":1456,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":2610003,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IS-9!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc2d44b8f-6639-4bce-9265-b1ce9603d84d_1498x988.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IS-9!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc2d44b8f-6639-4bce-9265-b1ce9603d84d_1498x988.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IS-9!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc2d44b8f-6639-4bce-9265-b1ce9603d84d_1498x988.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IS-9!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc2d44b8f-6639-4bce-9265-b1ce9603d84d_1498x988.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Source: A view of Kabul as documented by Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) during civil war, which shows destruction caused by in-fighting of fundamentalist groups following the fall of the pro-Russian government of Dr. Najibullah in 1992.</p><p>If we take the country as a whole, the demographic data suggest that Afghanistan in the 1990s was actually beginning its slow recovery from the horror of the 1980s. The question is how fast. </p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{"url":"https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?","text":"Subscribe now","action":null,"class":null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!di70!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc73f32d3-75d6-4384-ad0f-31237fc1f002_610x1112.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!di70!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc73f32d3-75d6-4384-ad0f-31237fc1f002_610x1112.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!di70!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc73f32d3-75d6-4384-ad0f-31237fc1f002_610x1112.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!di70!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc73f32d3-75d6-4384-ad0f-31237fc1f002_610x1112.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!di70!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc73f32d3-75d6-4384-ad0f-31237fc1f002_610x1112.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/c73f32d3-75d6-4384-ad0f-31237fc1f002_610x1112.png" width="610" height="1112" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/c73f32d3-75d6-4384-ad0f-31237fc1f002_610x1112.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":1112,"width":610,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":161827,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!di70!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc73f32d3-75d6-4384-ad0f-31237fc1f002_610x1112.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!di70!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc73f32d3-75d6-4384-ad0f-31237fc1f002_610x1112.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!di70!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc73f32d3-75d6-4384-ad0f-31237fc1f002_610x1112.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!di70!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc73f32d3-75d6-4384-ad0f-31237fc1f002_610x1112.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>In Chartbook #29 I used a set of figures for population whose origins are frankly a little obscure. They show a very low population in the 1990s and a surging increase after 2001. I chose them because I assumed that they excluded the refugee population. I was looking for a measure not of the Afghan population as a whole, but of the population remaining in Afghanistan. Since what I was after was the percentage of casualties amongst those exposed to the fighting, it seemed like the best series to use. The discrepancy to World Bank population figures was large. The gap I assumed was due to the refugee population. The US authorities counted over 6 million returnees after 2001. That was enough to explain the difference. </p><p>But the more I have learned about the difficulty of accounting for the refugee population, the less secure this approach seems. The safest figure to use is simply the population of all Afghans, whether inside or outside the country. I have recalculated the key tables here using the standard World Bank figures and updated those in Chartbook #29 online accordingly. The upshot is that as the intensity of combat declined in the 1990s in most of the country - the air raids stopped - the demographic recovery began. As a result, after 2001 the population doubles rather than tripling. </p><p>The refugee numbers are really a <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/afghanistan-displacement-challenges-country-move">minefield</a>. It is generally agreed that in 1990-1991 6.3 million Afghans were living in camps. After that, the overall number decreased. By the late 1990s the UNHCR count had fallen to 2.66 million. But the numbers fluctuate. In 2001 the figure was back up to 3.8 million. So how, if there were 3.8 million refugees in 2001 could over 6 million have voluntarily returned to Afghanistan over the following twenty years? How could there be more returnees than there were people in camps in 2001? </p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{"url":"https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?","text":"Subscribe now","action":null,"class":null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>The answer is that the refugee population is not static. People leave the camps to return, are then forced back into the camps from which they then “return” again. </p><p>Though the overall trend has been downhill since 2001, there were 2.6 million living in camps in 2000. As the Taliban advance becomes ever more ominous, that number is swelling by the day. </p><p>As this excellent <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/afghanistan-displacement-challenges-country-move">MPI report</a> notes, “only in January 2015, at the height of the Syrian crisis, did Afghans finally lose the status that they had held for 30 years as the world’s largest refugee population.” If Afghans again take to mass flight, how will their neighbors - above all Pakistan and Iran - react? </p><p></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G4TS!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45193cff-ec87-4803-abd9-09abddc2787d_1540x1106.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G4TS!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45193cff-ec87-4803-abd9-09abddc2787d_1540x1106.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G4TS!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45193cff-ec87-4803-abd9-09abddc2787d_1540x1106.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G4TS!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45193cff-ec87-4803-abd9-09abddc2787d_1540x1106.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G4TS!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45193cff-ec87-4803-abd9-09abddc2787d_1540x1106.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/45193cff-ec87-4803-abd9-09abddc2787d_1540x1106.png" width="1456" height="1046" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/45193cff-ec87-4803-abd9-09abddc2787d_1540x1106.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":1046,"width":1456,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":673451,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G4TS!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45193cff-ec87-4803-abd9-09abddc2787d_1540x1106.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G4TS!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45193cff-ec87-4803-abd9-09abddc2787d_1540x1106.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G4TS!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45193cff-ec87-4803-abd9-09abddc2787d_1540x1106.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!G4TS!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45193cff-ec87-4803-abd9-09abddc2787d_1540x1106.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>In 2016 the then Pakistani government demanded that all Afghans leave the country, precipitating a forced return of 500,000 people. In light of the ensuing chaos, in 2017 it relented. It is reckoned that 2.8-3 million documented and undocumented people from Afghanistan continue to live in Pakistan. Imran Khan’s government has let it be <a href="https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-refuses-host-additional-afghan-refugees">known</a> that it will accept no more. The proposed solution is to build camps on <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/pakistan-considers-iran-model-to-tackle-afghan-refugee-spillover-48521">the model of Iran</a>, not inside Pakistan but along the border to Afghanistan. </p><p>Meanwhile, relations between the US and Pakistan - once a designated ally in the region - continue to be <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f3d50eb9-5b2f-4472-ad7e-1a216e8e9ae1">strained</a>. Military aid to Pakistan was terminated by Trump. Then, after Pakistan helped to arrange talks with the Taliban, Prime Minister Khan was received at the White House. Talks were held between Pakistani security officials and Jake Sullivan at the end of July 2021. But Biden has yet to make time for a phone call with Prime Minister Khan. </p><p>Though the Taliban were a creature of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, in 2014 the Pakistani military struck a heavy blow against <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/42b7aecc-106a-437c-8add-185bbf9e446e">TPP</a>, the Pakistani associate of the Taliban. Right now, Islamabad and Washington share an interest in stabilizing Afghanistan. And so does China, which has One Belt One Road projects stretched across the region. In 2020, TPP reformed. Under the influence of AQ-inspired leaders, TPP has widened its appeal to strike against Chinese as well as American assets in the region. There is no outward sign, at least, of cooperation between the US, China and Pakistan. With victory apparently within sight, the Taliban in Afghanistan show no interest in coming to the table. As the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bc79c30f-e99e-4266-aac6-51498fc62423">FT </a>quoted Moeed Yusuf, Pakistan’s national security adviser: “Everybody’s lost leverage over the Taliban”.</p><p>To the North, Tajikistan has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/tajikistan-says-its-ready-take-up-100000-afghan-refugees-2021-07-23/">announced</a> that it is preparing to receive as many as 100,000 refugees from Afghanistan. It is already pre-positioning supplies. Tajikistan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-neighbours-wary-new-refugee-crisis-violence-surges-2021-07-15/">has</a> mobilized 20,000 reservists to secure its border and has asked Moscow, which has troops stationed in the country, to help it in containing any spillover of armed groups.</p><p>As Carter Malkasian remarked to the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bc79c30f-e99e-4266-aac6-51498fc62423">FT</a>: “The most painful moment is yet to come”. Given Afghanistan’s history, let us hope fervently that he is wrong. </p><p></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{"url":"https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?","text":"Subscribe now","action":null,"class":null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p></p><!--
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<p>https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/25/u.s.-policy-toward-central-asia-3.0-pub-62556</p><p>https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4315725/user-clip-george-w-bush-nation-building</p><p>http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:2516/ebrary9789280811971.pdf#page=252</p><p>https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396330312331343596?needAccess=true</p><p>Oct 7 2001 start of US offensive </p><p>On December 5, 2001 Bonn Agreement installs Hamid Karzai as interim administration head with backing of Iran-supported Northern alliance -> December 20, which establishes the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF.</p><p>U.S. strategy documents from these early years emphasized the “light footprint” approach to reconstruction due to the desire to not get drawn into, or give the impression of, a “long-term [military] occupation of Afghanistan.</p><p>with less than one month between 9/11 and the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, there was no time for systematic planning or assessing Afghanistan’s economic needs. Some of the initial foundational investments, undertaken in concert with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, included the critical priorities of macroeconomic stabilization, institutional infrastructure development, monetary policy creation, banking system rehabilitation, currency conversion, government revenue collection, and basic economic governance. These efforts, which were considered successful, made early growth possible and set the stage for future development. The U.S. government also emphasized the promotion of investment, the privatization of the former state-owned enterprises (SOE), trade liberalization, lowering barriers to trade, integration with regional and world markets, and accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). USAID, the lead agency for U.S. private sector development efforts, focused primarily on agriculture, the “cornerstone of recovery and a pillar of reconstruction for a sustainable future.” Agriculture was recognized as a crucial sector of the Afghan economy, with the potential for multiplier effects and linkages with other sectors.</p><p>In its 2001 approach paper, the World Bank recommended that a substantial portion of on-budget international aid be channeled through a non-earmarked trust fund.184</p><p>At the end of 2001, in addition to the widespread use of several foreign currencies, at least three versions of the afghani were circulating, including two warlord counterfeit currencies trading at a discount -> steering committee of senior officials from DAB and the MOF, and international experts from the IMF, USAID, the German central bank Deutsche Bundesbank, and the UN. IMF favors dollarization but this is blocked by Afghans who want a new Afghani. The introduction of a new afghani (AFN) so quickly and under such extremely fluid political conditions, with the challenges provided by Afghanistan’s geography and poor infrastructure, and with no accurate knowledge of the amount of old currency in circulation, was a massive undertaking. Once the outlines of the plan were established, USAID led the media and public outreach campaign to inform as many Afghans as possible of the conversion to the new currency, relying heavily on radio broadcasts and word-of-mouth dissemination. The plan was for money changers to exchange their currency first, followed two weeks later by the general public. The exchange rate was set at AFA1,000 to AFN1.303 The entire conversion was envisioned as taking eight weeks. USAID was instrumental in establishing the Bagram Bank of DAB for promoting the new Afghan currency and processing the in-flow of the physical currency by the U.S. Army.305 USAID also set up an air operations unit and provided two helicopters and one airplane to manage the air transport of the currency to distribution points. The Afghan Air Force also provided assistance in the early stages of the currency conversion</p><p>After the IMF’s January 2002 preliminary assessment to determine the levels and types of assistance needed, the World Bank and the IMF, supported by USAID AEGP and Treasury, along with international partners DFID and GIZ, focused on rebuilding the capacity of key MOF departments, beginning with the treasury, accounting, budget, and customs departments. These efforts met with varying levels of success. </p><p>While over 60 nations helped to fund Afghanistan’s reconstruction, U.S. aid dwarfed all other individual country funding.45 Since FY 2002, the U.S. Congress has appropriated $122.09 billion in reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan.46 Almost immediately following 9/11, debates began about how much funding would be required to reconstruct Afghanistan, with little or no empirical basis for precise estimates. At the November 2001 Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) on reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan, cochaired by the United States and Japan, authorities estimated a notional $10 billion for funding over 10 years based on past international experience. This was substantially increased two months later by the $14.6 billion main estimate in the “Afghanistan Preliminary Needs Assessment for Recovery and Reconstruction” produced by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the UN Development Program (UNDP).47 Meanwhile, according to a report by Radio Free Europe, Afghanistan’s Interim Authority stated in January 2002 that reconstruction would require $45 billion over a 10-year period.48 The Tokyo donor’s conference that same month led to international pledges of $1.8 billion for 2002 and a total of $4.5 billion across a range of timeframes.49</p><p>After a political agreement was reached in Bonn in December 2001, the next several months witnessed a frenetic series of meetings in Kabul, Washington, and other world capitals, with the United States and more than 60 other nations trying to assess what was needed immediately and over the longer term, ]</p><p>During the Senior Officials Meeting of the January 2002 Tokyo conference, international representatives pledged $1.8 billion for 2002 and a total of $4.5 billion in grants for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Donors were largely enthusiastic, as the international community felt a strong desire to show support in the wake of the tragedy of 9/11.120 Of the more than $1.8 billion disbursed in ODA during 2002, approximately 26.4 percent came from the United States</p><p>With USAID funding, the Center for International Private Enterprise joined with the Afghan-American Chamber of Commerce to try to create a truly independent Chamber of Commerce, which would be able to support itself by selling services to its members and would encourage investment. In 2001, there were two chambers, each with its own constituency of traders or producers, with diverging interests and the inability to speak with one voice. The highly bureaucratic pre-1978 Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) was linked to MOCI, and had little private sector involvement. CIPE tried to push the moribund ACCI to play a more proactive role in supporting and advocating for the private sector as a chamber would do in the United States. At the same time, however, German GIZ was providing financial and technical support to the state-affiliated chamber, and U.S. and German views diverged on what a chamber should look like. The resulting uncertainty about who would represent the interests of the private sector detracted from the effectiveness of the chamber.502 The Virginia-based Afghan-American Chamber of Commerce was founded in 2002 as a Section 501(c)(3) organization with the mission of “improving and strengthening business relationships and trade among Afghan- and Americanowned businesses” and promoting “the ideals of a market economy in Afghanistan free from corruption in which U.S., Afghan, and other businesses can operate successfully.”503 Originally partly funded by USAID through CIPE, its main activity has been organizing an annual matchmaking conference in Washington, but it has also sponsored or participated in trade shows and conferences in Kabul, Dubai, and elsewhere. The UK’s DFID provided funding for the Afghanistan Investment Climate Facility (Harakat), whose mission was to “remove and reduce barriers to doing business by providing grant funds to government, civil society, and the private sector</p><p>Beginning in January 2002, the World Bank, Treasury, and ADB resident experts began work on developing Afghanistan’s budgets.281 The IMF’s initial assessment found that while the MOF had a sound legal framework for budget formation, most of the legal practices had not been used for many years, primarily because of insufficient reporting from provinces, a lack of automation in offices, and lack of trained staff. The adoption in April 2002 of the April 2002–March 2003 operating budget by the Afghan Interim Administration was therefore a huge feat considering the lack of financial information available. This achievement </p><p>The 2002 U.S. national security strategy, for example, stated that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”6 This belief was enlisted and employed in President George W. Bush’s Global War on Terror, and continued to be held throughout the President Barack Obama administration.</p><p>At the same time, however, beginning in 2002, USAID was under substantial pressure from the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) and other agencies to rehabilitate the Ring Road, which led to budgetary shortfalls and forced defunding of other programs, including agriculture</p><p>In 2002, the Afghan government had to decide between setting up a state-owned telecommunications network with a single provider and allowing open bidding for service contracts. Ashraf Ghani, then Minister of Finance, strongly supported the latter private-sector approach.330 Ghani also called on OPIC to provide risk guarantees to help investors, which it did. Afghanistan approved its first Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) license with the Afghan Wireless Communication Company in 2002 and its second GSM license with Roshan in 2003. Roshan is now the largest mobile service provider in Afghanistan, with over 6.5 million subscribers.</p><p>April 2002 operation anaconda launched against remaining AQ forces Shah-i-Kot Valley south of the city of Gardez (Paktia Province). Nearly two thousand U.S. and one thousand Afghan troops battle the militants. but wind down and shift to iraq continues. </p><p><em>April 17, 2002</em>Reconstructing Afghanistan President George W. Bush calls for the reconstruction of Afghanistan in a speech at the Virginia Military Institute. “By helping to build an Afghanistan that is free from this evil and is a better place in which to live, we are working in the best traditions of George Marshall,” he says, evoking the post-World War II Marshall Plan that revived Western Europe. But the United States and the international community do not come close to Marshall Plan-like reconstruction spending for Afghanistan. The U.S. Congress appropriates over $38 billion in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009. BIZARRE!!!! </p><p>April 2002 With the encouragement of the United States and its allies, and in a break from modern Afghan tradition, Afghanistan adopted a market economy. Private sector development was included as one of the three pillars in the new government’s first official strategy document, the April 2002 National Development Framework (NDF).125 </p><p>Maintaining stability was further complicated by the widespread circulation of foreign currencies, especially the U.S. dollar, which influenced inflation and made control of the domestic money supply more difficult. It was imperative to establish a monetary policy mechanism or the massive inflows of foreign assistance would quickly lead to inflation and an erosion of the value of the new currency.312 Therefore, the IMF supported DAB in implementing a system of foreign exchange auctions beginning in May 2002. These auctions were open to all money changers, including the informal hawala traders. Measures were taken to avoid potential pitfalls, such as the cornering of the market by high-volume money traders. Auctions were held every one to two weeks for the first few years, and slightly less frequently to the present.313 In September 2004, DAB added daily, short-term capital note auctions in addition to the foreign exchange auctions to manage the domestic money supply.314</p><p>A second major issue was to what extent international assistance would be channeled on-budget through the Afghan government or spent off-budget by the donors themselves. (See page 38.) To provide a mechanism to simplify international donor funding streams for on-budget aid so they would be easier for the nascent Afghan government to manage, in May 2002 the World Bankadministered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund was launched through a joint proposal with UNDP, ADB, and the Islamic Development Bank. Especially in the early years, the majority of bilateral U.S. aid was provided off-budget, justified in part because of the widespread assumption that Afghanistan was a blank slate, without any functioning and accountable institutions or capacity for implementation.</p><p><em>June 2002</em>Transitional Government Named Hamid Karzai, chairman of Afghanistan’s interim administration since December 2001, is picked to head the country’s transitional government. His selection comes during an emergency loya jirga assembled in Kabul, attended by 1,550 delegates (including about 200 women) from Afghanistan’s 364 districts. Karzai, leader of the powerful Popalzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns, returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan after the 9/11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban. Some observers allege Karzai tolerates corruption by members of his clan and his government. The Northern Alliance, dominated by ethnic Tajiks, fails in its effort to set up a prime ministership, but does succeed in checking presidential powers by assigning major authorities to the elected parliament, such as the power to veto senior official nominees and to impeach a president.</p><p>On September 4, 2002, President Karzai publicly announced the conversion, and the actual process started one month later. Despite public uncertainty and some currency depreciation that required DAB to extend the conversion period by one month, the entire process successfully concluded in early January 2003 without major events or financial hiccups.307 The achieved exchange rate of around AFN50 per dollar was seen as comforting to the population, as it had traditionally been in that range until the start of conflict in 1978. </p><p>Since 2002, DOD has spent around $2.5 billion to support Afghan information and communications technology (ICT), primarily to provide networked communications support for the ANDSF.334 State and USAID have also supported the ICT sector through investments of $83 million and $44 million, respectively, with State focusing on supporting independent media and USAID concentrating on capacity development within the Afghan government. Although USAID has been working in this sector since 2001, direct ICT program support through State did not begin until 2010.335 The U.S. efforts in Afghan ICT as a whole were coordinated by U.S. Embassy Kabul, originally through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Group. In 2010, the ISAF Telecommunications Advisory Team assumed responsibility for coordination until the ISAF mission ended in 2014.336 Additional support in telecommunications development was provided by the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, which in 2002 funded a short-term advisor to the Ministry of Telecommunications to assist the ministry in drafting the telecom policy.337 USTDA also conducted feasibility studies and provided policy advice that, in the agency’s 2005 and 2009 annual reports, was identified as critical to designing and implementing subsequent projects, including establishing a national satellite network, microwave communications systems, and the fiber optic ring network, discussed below.338</p><p><em>November 2002</em>Establishing a Reconstruction Model The U.S. military creates a civil affairs framework to coordinate redevelopment with UN and nongovernmental organizations and to expand the authority of the Kabul government. These so-called provincial reconstruction teams, or PRTs, are stood up first in Gardez in November, followed by Bamiyan, Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Herat. Command for individual PRTs is eventually handed over to NATO states. While credited with improving security for aid agencies, the model is not universally praised. Concern mounts that the PRT system lacks central controlling authority, is disorganized, and creates what a U.S. Institute of Peace report calls “an ad hoc approach” to security and development. Such criticism grows beyond the PRT program and becomes a common theme in the NATO war effort, as a maze of ìnational caveatsî restricts the activities of member forces. Critics contend this limits the coalition’s effectiveness.</p><p>Therefore, beginning in November 2002, USAID launched AEGP to help support IMF and World Bank initiatives to develop monetary policy and increase DAB’s capacity to implement it.309 To help ensure the successful implementation of the new monetary policy, the IMF and Afghan authorities agreed that DAB would remain independent and would maintain full control over the printing of the new currency. In turn, the government would maintain financial discipline and would not require DAB to finance any government deficit.310 The international community insisted on the latter stipulation to guard against runaway deficit spending.311 With an independent central bank, a floating exchange rate, and no functioning banking system, options for monetary policy were limited.</p><p>In November 2002, USAID launched its first post-2001 economic growth program in Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Economic Governance Program (AEGP), a $30 million program which ultimately increased to $90 million.132 The AEGP ran through December 2005 and was implemented by the contractor BearingPoint as a catch-all program for economic reform, including property rights and land titling.133 Reflecting the priorities outlined in USAID’s early strategy documents, AEGP focused on four sectors: fiscal, financial, legal and regulatory, and trade policy.134 Also, as was the case with most projects supporting Afghan institutions, AEGP included capacity building, with advisors working alongside</p><p>By the end of 2002, U.S. officials began to consider the possibility that more resources would be needed to stabilize Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the United States was increasingly preoccupied with the looming invasion of Iraq. </p><p>This urgency, specifically in enacting commercial laws, can be seen in the adoption of the Banking Law in 2003, even before the new constitution. At the time, the 1994 Law on Money and Banking had been in effect since the mujahedeen government, and many of DAB’s outlined objectives, responsibilities, and powers were ill-defined and outdated.347 Given the moribund state of the commercial banking sector and acknowledging the critical role financial institutions play in economic growth, Afghan authorities, with support from USAID, the IMF, and DFID, sought to improve financial sector laws so the commercial banking sector could expand</p><p>Starting in 2003, USAID funded the development of three industrial parks (Bagrami near Kabul, Gorimar in Balkh Province, and Shorandam in Kandahar) which were intended to be transferred to AISA oversight. The $10 million initial contract with the firm Technologists Inc. was increased to $21.1 million when power generation and other infrastructure were added to the scope.506 In 2005, USAID also funded an industrial park in Helmand Province, which was taken over by DFID two years later as part of its overall assistance to Helmand, although support for the park was terminated in 2013. The World Bank also worked with AISA in 2005 to form two industrial parks, in Kabul and Jalalabad, although this support was terminated in 2011. The PRTs, notably the U.S.-led PRT in Jalalabad, also contributed to development of industrial parks. As of mid-2017, there were nine operational industrial parks in Afghanistan, including several pre-2001 state-owned industrial properties, with an additional ten under construction and six planned.50</p><p>By early 2003, however, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a skeptic of nation building, began to consider the possibility that more resources would be needed to stabilize Afghanistan.150 Afghan-American Zalmay Khalilzad, who had been a member of President Bush’s transition team at DOD and was at the time serving as Special Envoy for Afghanistan, agreed that a more robust “state- and nation-building program” was needed. Encouraged by Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Khalilzad prepared a stepped-up U.S. strategy to consolidate the Afghan government’s control over the country.151 The strategy, Accelerating Success, was approved by President Bush in June 2003. Accelerating Success was designed to show quick and visible progress and to reduce the risks posed by expected increases in violence before the 2004 Afghan presidential elections. An additional motivation was the Bush administration’s desire to show progress to a domestic audience as the U.S. presidential election approached. The strategy’s “stepped-up economic development programs” focused on bolstering economic and financial institutions, which, it was hoped, would help foster progress in reconstruction.152 Specifically, Accelerating Success appeared to prioritize revenue collection to help ensure sustainable government budgets.153 The initiative was ambitious, requiring the U.S. government to support the reconstruction of the Kabul to Kandahar portion </p><p>The stepped-up economic activities of the 2003 Accelerating Success strategy included more visible infrastructure projects. President Bush announced that road construction was a top priority and, highlighting the shared priorities of Hamid Karzai and U.S. Embassy officials, U.S. Ambassador Robert Finn pressed for more funds for roads.154 In 2002, Ambassador Finn wrote: Because Afghanistan is so fragmented, its most immediate need—as Chairman [of the Interim Administration] Karzai knows—is to be knitted together and, in order to protect our nation’s investment and sacrifices here, to be knitted together soon. A dramatic, visible, hope-inspiring, and developmentally sound way to accomplish this goal is to build roads and bridges. . . . One poignant project would be the repair of the Kabul-Kandahar road, originally built by the [United States]. Chairman Karzai’s priorities should be our priorities as, to paraphrase [President] Bush’s recent remarks, his success is surely ours.155 Despite USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios’ skepticism over funding big infrastructure projects due to their high cost and “dubious economic consequences,” as well as the lack of engineering firms, equipment, and trained personnel to implement them, the NSC tasked USAID with the reconstruction of the Kabul-Kandahar portion of the Ring Road. (See figure 5.)156</p><p>The 2003 Telecommunications and Internet Policy established the regulatory framework for the industry and created the interim governing body, the Telecom Regulatory Board (TRB), within the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT). The TRB drafted the National Numbering Plan, the National Frequency Table, and began working on the Telecommunications Law. In 2005, this law was enacted and the Afghanistan Telecom Regulatory Authority replaced both the TRB and the State Radio Inspection Department and became the primary regulatory agency.332 While the Afghan government established a favorable regulatory environment, private investors and donors sought to create or rehabilitate technical capacity. For example, the World Bank’s Rehabilitation of Telecommunications Systems Project worked between 2003 and 2006 to connect Afghanistan to neighboring countries by rebuilding the satellite earth station in Kabul, as well as improving transmission links.33</p><p><em>May 1, 2003</em>‘Major Combat’ Over During a briefing with reporters in Kabul, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declares an end to “major combat.” The announcement coincides with President George W. Bush’s “mission accomplished” declaration of an end to fighting in Iraq. Rumsfeld says President Bush, U.S. Central Command Chief Gen. Tommy Franks, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai “have concluded that we are at a point where we clearly have moved from major combat activity to a period of stability and stabilization and reconstruction and activities.” There are only eight thousand U.S. soldiers stationed in Afghanistan. It is predicted that the transition from combat to reconstruction will open the door for many aid organizations, particularly European groups, that had balked at sending troops, supplies, or other assistance.</p><p>By 2003, as insecurity grew and donors became concerned that the reconstruction effort was faltering, more resources, primarily from the United States, began to flow into Afghanistan to support what would eventually be formalized as the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy</p><p>Also during 2003, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Group was created by the NSC as a flexible and “experimental” institution staffed by senior private sector executives who could advise both the U.S. and Afghan governments. The ARG was widely seen as Ambassador Khalilzad’s reaction to existing aid channels and institutions, which he considered cumbersome, bureaucratic, and slow.166 Despite the alignment of Afghan government strategy documents with the international community’s overall strategy and outlook, a number of contentious issues emerged during this period. One issue concerned the role of the state and whether it should be more like the United States or more of a “BritishSouth Asian, government-led concept of how services should be provided to the people.”167 Further, while the United States emphasized the “light state,” German officials stressed “the importance of combining the principles of a market economy with values of social responsibility.”168</p><p><em>August 8, 2003</em>An International Mission The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumes control of international security forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan, expanding NATO/ISAF’s role across the country. It is NATO’s first operational commitment outside of Europe. Originally tasked with securing Kabul and its surrounding areas, NATO expands in September 2005, July 2006, and October 2006. The number of ISAF troops grows accordingly, from an initial five thousand to around sixty-five thousand troops from forty-two countries, including all twenty-eight NATO member states. In 2006, ISAF assumes command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the U.S.-led coalition, and also becomes more involved in intensive combat operations in southern Afghanistan.</p><p>in September 2003, an Afghan presidential directive created the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, a new institution with the mission of facilitating and promoting domestic and foreign investment. Supported financially and technically by the German development agency Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), AISA was intended to be a “one-stop shop” that would bypass government bureaucracy.138</p><p>Regional integration was prioritized from 2002 onward in the belief that increased linkages with neighboring countries would create opportunities for such trade and investment, as well as contribute to stability through building relationships. In 2004, Afghanistan gained observer status in the WTO with the hope that joining the WTO would help Afghanistan reap the benefits of opening to trade. WTO accession was also seen as a positive forcing function for the country to meet numerous international standards that would be needed for Afghanistan to engage in international commerce</p><p> Shaheen Exchange, a money service provider founded and run by Sherkhan Farnood.317 Farnood started the Shaheen Exchange in 1996 after authorities in Moscow, where his previous business was based, charged him with illegal banking and money laundering. He managed to stay on the run until he returned to Kabul after the collapse of the Taliban regime to found the ill-fated Kabul Bank in 2004 and plot a highly sophisticated money laundering scheme using the Shaheen Exchange.318 (For more details, see Kabul Bank Crisis, page 83.) </p><p>Although the U.S. Geological Survey was tasked in 2002 with identifying natural resources and their potential contribution to Afghanistan reconstruction, it did not begin work within Afghanistan until 2004.553 The surviving Soviet surveys, recovered in 2004 by USGS and returning Afghan Geological Survey employees, provided a basis for aerial surveys conducted that year with support from USAID. Additional surveys were completed in 2006 (see figure 9).554 </p><p>CERP was originally developed in Iraq and introduced in Afghanistan in 2004 as a means of providing short-term stabilization and “walk-around” money for the PRTs. During the surge period, the use of CERP funds expanded from meeting emergency and security needs to infrastructure (including roads), agriculture, and incentivizing entrepreneurship and growth of small and medium enterprises</p><p>1 The Constitution of Afghanistan was signed in January 2004, after which subsequent laws to shape the new market economy were passed; in some cases, these various laws contradict each other. In practice, three legal systems, including traditional law, sharia law, and the formal or statutory laws, exist concurrently within Afghanistan, and it is often unclear which ones take precedence.322 Moreover, decisions made by traditional shuras and jirgas, which may or may not conform to the written laws of Afghanistan, are often endorsed by agencies within MOJ.323</p><p>2004 The primacy of the private sector was made official in Article 10 of the 2004 constitution, which declared that “the state shall encourage, protect, as well as ensure the safety of capital investment and private enterprises in accordance with the provisions of the law and market economy.”126 All subsequent strategy documents affirmed the government’s aim of “development of an enabling environment that encourages the private sector to play a central role in the economic development of the country,” and that “government is the policy maker and regulator of the economy, not its competitor.”127 In the words of the chairman of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, “The state will enter into a direct managerial role only when social justice demands its presence.”1</p><p>In trade, 2004 began with the signing of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) and ended with Afghanistan being granted observer status to the WTO, the first step toward full membership. </p><p>By 2004, Pakistan was considered a neo-NATO ally and allowed to buy weapons.</p><p>In February 2004, Ambassador Khalilzad pledged to Karzai that the United States would pave 1,000 km of secondary roads connecting the Ring Road to regional road networks by the end of the year. The embassy had $100 million in funds for this through Accelerating Success, though the original cost estimate failed to factor in the expenses of demining and other required preparations. The estimate was later adjusted to $215 million, but the original amount had already been allocated, creating a budgetary shortfall.157 The directive to build roads created a dilemma for USAID, as the budget shortfall required it to revamp its priorities and slash other programs to fund the secondary roads.158 A 2004 embassy cable reported that USAID’s RAMP would be cut by $4.5 million to support the roads.159 Similarly, $10 million was cut from other agricultural programs, leaving only enough money to fund the alternative livelihoods activity. Further, $15 million was cut from economic growth programs, $12.5 million from water and irrigation programs, and $8.5 million from democracy and governance programs, including rule of law initiatives and support for local government and parliament.160 Yet, even these cuts failed to fill the funding gap. Ultimately, USAID was forced to suspend work on the road and delay its completion.161 Administrator Natsios argued that much of the failure surrounding infrastructure construction stemmed from the rush to show progress on development projects that would inherently be slow and messy, but sustainable and completed with Afghan buy-in.162 The Bush administration’s desire for visible and tangible signs of progress led to a focus on “burn rate” at the NSC, where dollars spent and number of projects implemented became the benchmarks.163 The timelines for the Ring Road were unrealistic from the beginning, and while USAID was heavily criticized by the NSC for failing to meet deadlines, it had not been consulted on the deadlines or even the assigned tasks.</p><p>Between March and July 2004, a number of new taxes were put into place, including rental services, business receipts, and wage withholding. USAID also supported the development of a fixed tax schedule on money changers and the establishment of various tax compliance and education programs.285 A 2008 UK review attributed a significant part of the post-2005 decrease in foreign and domestic private investment to a 2004 tax reform and the subsequent aggressive rent-seeking behavior of officials in the MOF Revenue Department’s Large Taxpayers’ Office, which the review labeled an “economic ‘shock’ which has, to a significant extent, caused a reduction and stagnation in foreign and domestic private investment since 2005.”295</p><p>In September 2004, USAID’s Land Titling and Economic Restructuring in Afghanistan (LTERA) sought to promote investment through the two primary goals of “improving land tenure security for millions of Afghans and assisting the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to undertake a comprehensive privatization program.”139 Resolving land tenure and ownership issues was seen as key to encouraging economic activity; land titling was urgent, given the poor and unreliable land records and the fact that the first land grabs by strongmen were starting to take place. (See page 32.)</p><p>One of the most important, early initiatives of U.S. support to private sector development was the privatization or liquidation of the majority of the 65 Afghan SOEs, which were considered moribund and inefficient. Assuming that enterprises owned by the state would become more productive if owned and operated by private companies that were subject to competition, the privatization of these SOEs was seen as a means to promote private investment, especially from foreign investors willing to enter the Afghan market. Privatization was also envisioned as generating revenue for the government and, at the same time, as a means to limit opportunities for corrupt activities by government officials and well-connected business owners.472 With all of these factors in mind, DFID, GIZ, and USAID launched privatization-focused programs in Afghanistan early in the reconstruction period.473 Privatization was one of the two primary goals of the USAID Land Titling and Economic Restructuring in Afghanistan program launched in 2004.474 Firms and entrepreneurs consistently reported the availability of titled land as one of the most serious constraints to economic activity. Privatization of the SOEs was not, however, on many Afghans’ list of urgent priorities. The LTERA program consisted of a group of advisors from Emerging Markets Group, housed within the MOF and several other Afghan government institutions.475 Because the majority of the SOEs were degraded due to more than two decades of conflict, neglect, and plunder, many state assets were underutilized; LTERA sought to have the Afghan government sell these assets to the private sector for industrial and commercial purposes. As the SOEs were historically one of the few sources of employment in the formal sector, the program was also tasked with developing a “social safety net program” to ease the transition to private sector or other employment for the more than 14,000 SOE personnel (55 percent of the estimated 25,406 total employees) who were to be laid off during the process. LTERA reported that 1,380 former employees received a total of $1.7 million in severance payments.476 Disposal of the SOEs faced a number of challenges, starting with establishing rightful ownership, which was far from straightforward due to the oftenconflicting ownership deeds, many of dubious legitimacy, which had been issued by successive governments. Because in many cases the most valuable component of the SOEs’ assets was land, it was also necessary to implement land titling programs to formalize property rights and validate land records for settlements. While these two issues were rightly recognized as linked, the rush to privatization often happened before land ownership was clarified. And, because of the complex ownership issues, questions arose as to how the assets should be valued. The government of Afghanistan was officially committed to privatization; however, because the process was controversial and political support was minimal, progress was slow.477 In 2005, the Afghan government finally adopted a privatization program, but its single-page guiding document lacked the needed details.478 That same year, the cabinet approved the amendment of the existing SOE law granting the MOF authority to divest.479 This was done in advance of the election of the parliament, whose members’ interests were expected to complicate any reforms. After convening in early 2006, the parliament further slowed the process by conducting drawn-out reviews of amendments to the enabling laws, including an additional clause stipulating that members would have to approve any proposals to liquidate SOEs.480 USAID reported a few success stories from the privatization program. For example, the old headquarters of the Industrial Development Bank was sold to a company that imported computer hardware and software and employed more than twice the number of people who had been employed by the bank. The program completion report also noted that the assets from the Power Construction Enterprise were transferred to the national electric company, Da Afghanistan Brishna Sherkat, which was subsequently corporatized and regarded as one of the successes in restructuring government institutions.481 While all but nine of the 65 SOEs that existed in 2002 were eventually privatized or liquidated, much of the liquidation of publicly owned assets consisted of selling the land and assets, often to individuals with connections to government officials.482 The fact that many formerly productive assets were liquidated and land was sold for nonindustrial purposes exacerbated the sentiment in the population that the free market economy as being practiced in Afghanistan only benefited well-connected individuals. Therefore, privatization not only fell short on achieving the goals of reallocating whatever productive assets existed within the SOEs and generating the anticipated investment in productive ventures, but also fostered corruption through resource capture, rather than limiting possibilities for corruption by government officials. According to a later analysis, “The privatization of SOEs came before any major business environment reform. . . . [After privatization,] the enterprises still did not generate activity and most were liquidated</p><p><em>October 9, 2004</em>A New President for Afghanistan In historic national balloting, Karzai becomes the first democratically elected head of Afghanistan. Voters turn out in high numbers despite threats of violence and intimidation. Karzai wins with 55 percent of the vote, while his closest rival, former education minister Younis Qanooni, polls 16 percent. Karzai’s election victory is marred by accusations of fraud by his opponents and by the kidnapping of three foreign UN election workers by a militant group. But the election is nonetheless hailed as a victory for the fragile nation; Afghans had not gone to the polls since 1969, when they cast ballots in parliamentary elections during the reign of King Mohammed Zahir Shah.</p><p>At a meeting convened by the German Federation of Industries in advance of the November 2004 Berlin Conference for donors to pledge additional support for private sector development, Karzai and other senior officials touted the new liberal trade and investment laws and the recent establishment of AISA, and reiterated support for the private sector in the context of Afghanistan’s trading history and its strategic location astride trade routes. Karzai described his vision as “less government, more society, and more business. We don’t want to remain poor; we want to get rich.”169</p><p>By the time of the Berlin Conference, however, it was clear that not all Afghan officials supported the same extent of reliance on the market economy. The government’s updated development strategy, Securing Afghanistan’s Future (SAF), which contained this market-oriented approach, was presented at Berlin but never approved.181 Noting that “removing obstacles to private sector development [was] an urgent priority,” SAF reiterated the importance of trade liberalization and World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, developing and implementing trade and investment-related policies, building the capacity of relevant ministries, and facilitating regional transit and transportation.182 One analyst wrote that SAF “ignores the reality of a highly uneven playing field in the world economy and fails to address the fundamentals of social justice and existing inequalities. . . . There should be a heavier state playing a more interventionist role.”183</p><p>In December 2004, Karzai appointed a new Minister of Finance, Anwar-ul Haq Ahadi, to replace Ashraf Ghani, who had been the driving force behind the SAF strategy. Ghani’s removal was due to a combination of disagreements with the rest of the cabinet over his vision for a modified market-oriented economy (i.e., tight fiscal discipline with no subsidies or price controls), as well as the generally strained relationships with the other ministers, who saw his aggressive reforms and control of the government budget as those of a “de facto prime minister.</p><p>By 2005, despite USAID’s struggle to complete these major construction projects, Ambassador Ronald Neumann, as part of his plea to the U.S. government to do more to win the war, urged more ambitious projects, calling for an additional $600 million to connect eastern and southern provincial centers to the Ring Road via gravel roads. In his effort to convince Washington to allocate more funds to Afghanistan, Ambassador Neumann stated that “in this fight, roads are life,” and that construction of roads was the most important means to both extend state presence and promote economic activity.164</p><p></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BF0H!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79c6825e-7176-437a-8881-1c74e2856f63_1402x1246.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BF0H!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79c6825e-7176-437a-8881-1c74e2856f63_1402x1246.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BF0H!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79c6825e-7176-437a-8881-1c74e2856f63_1402x1246.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BF0H!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79c6825e-7176-437a-8881-1c74e2856f63_1402x1246.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BF0H!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79c6825e-7176-437a-8881-1c74e2856f63_1402x1246.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/79c6825e-7176-437a-8881-1c74e2856f63_1402x1246.png" width="1402" height="1246" data-attrs="{"src":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/79c6825e-7176-437a-8881-1c74e2856f63_1402x1246.png","srcNoWatermark":null,"fullscreen":null,"imageSize":null,"height":1246,"width":1402,"resizeWidth":null,"bytes":389623,"alt":null,"title":null,"type":"image/png","href":null,"belowTheFold":true,"topImage":false,"internalRedirect":null,"isProcessing":false,"align":null,"offset":false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BF0H!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79c6825e-7176-437a-8881-1c74e2856f63_1402x1246.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BF0H!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79c6825e-7176-437a-8881-1c74e2856f63_1402x1246.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BF0H!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79c6825e-7176-437a-8881-1c74e2856f63_1402x1246.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BF0H!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F79c6825e-7176-437a-8881-1c74e2856f63_1402x1246.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container restack-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-refresh-cw"><path d="M3 12a9 9 0 0 1 9-9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1 6.74 2.74L21 8"></path><path d="M21 3v5h-5"></path><path d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 1-9 9 9.75 9.75 0 0 1-6.74-2.74L3 16"></path><path d="M8 16H3v5"></path></svg></div><div class="pencraft pc-reset icon-container view-image"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></div></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p></p><p>In 2005, another USAID project, Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program (RAMP), provided a $3.8 million grant to the Afghanistan Renewal Fund (ARF), which was established the previous year by Afghan Capital Partners (Acap), an independent company with offices in London and Kabul. RAMP’s interest was in supporting direct investment in Afghan agribusiness, with the intention that the fund would continue to use USAID’s contribution beyond RAMP’s 2006 end date.148</p><p>The U.S. government created new structures and processes to reflect the role of development in security and to enable a comprehensive or “whole of government” approach. In 2005, National Security Presidential Directive 44 gave the Department of State responsibility for the coordination of and planning for stability operations and established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the Policy Coordination Committee for Stability and Reconstruction.8 In January 2006, the Bush administration created the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance within the State Department to tighten the use of foreign assistance to achieve foreign policy objectives.</p><p><em>May 23, 2005</em>An Enduring U.S. Commitment Afghan president Hamid Karzai and U.S. president George W. Bush issue a joint declaration that pronounces their respective countries strategic partners. The declaration gives U.S. forces access to Afghan military facilities to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The alliance’s goal, the agreement says, is to “strengthen U.S.-Afghan ties and help ensure Afghanistan’s long-term security, democracy, and prosperity.” Moreover, the agreement calls for Washington to “help organize, train, equip, and sustain Afghan security forces as Afghanistan develops the capacity to undertake this responsibility,” and to continue to rebuild the country’s economy and political democracy.</p><p>In 2005, at the request of the Afghan government, USTDA provided a grant to MOMP to fund a feasibility study for Afghanistan’s cement sector. The study forecast that, with ongoing and planned reconstruction projects, the consumption of cement would rise by an average annual rate of 5.8 percent between 2005 and 2020.483 With Afghanistan having no significant cement production of its own, the study produced a strategy that focused on the revitalization of the Ghori plant. Ghori was selected for revitalization because other pre-1978 plants to the south of the 11,000 foot high Salang Pass did not have sufficient proximity to raw materials (limestone) and fuel (coal), and were also considered vulnerable to competition from Pakistan and Iran, which were in the process of aggressively expanding their own production capacity. Moreover, in addition to the 800 workers in Pul-e Khumri with cement plant experience, the population of the area had relatively greater familiarity with industrial processes due to the location of several factories there before 1978.484 During and after the factory’s privatization in 2006, a number of irregularities were identified, including: (1) provisions in the tender document that favored the Afghan Investment Company (AIC) associated with Mahmoud Karzai and Sherkhan Farnood, the brother of President Karzai and the head of Kabul Bank, respectively; (2) lack of any stipulated penalties for noncompliance with contract terms; (3) intervention by Mahmoud Karzai and the brother of former Vice President Marshall Fahim who had allied to win the contract; and (4) intervention by President Karzai. At least one former MOMP official claimed MOMP awarded the contract to AIC two days in advance of issuing the government’s tender. According to the NGO Integrity Watch Afghanistan, “Some of the favors granted to AIC border on flagrant violation of even the most basic standards.” There were also allegations that the previous minister of MOMP was fired from his job because he raised questions about the AIC bid.485 Since its privatization, the factory has not delivered on promises to turn around the former SOE, modernize the factory and the affiliated coal mines (which are now unable to provide enough coal to run the factory), complete the second plant and build a third plant and new power station, and create thousands of local jobs with significant amenities and benefits.486 Mahmoud Karzai sold his shares in 2011, supposedly to repay loans to the defunct Kabul Bank. He blames the government for not attracting foreign investors, for not taking action against Pakistan for dumping subsidized cement in the Afghan market and obstructing the transit of needed equipment, and for actively trying to sabotage the private sector. For their part, government officials claim that Karzai and other investors lost interest and moved their resources to invest in Dubai real estate. IAs the only significant cement factory in Afghanistan, Ghori should have been well placed to capitalize on the huge demand for cement, which can be produced almost completely with local inputs, during the boom years of reconstruction. Yet, between 2002 and 2012, Afghanistan imported on average four million tons of cement per year, most of which came from Pakistan. At its peak in 2011 before the drawdown, Afghanistan was importing $243.63 million in cement from Pakistan alone.488</p><p>An income tax law in 2005 attempted to encourage businesses by reducing the top marginal tax rate from 60 percent to 20 percent, plus an additional fixed amount of 8,750 afghanis ($175 at the 2005 exchange rate). The law also provided certain licensebased tax privileges for the extractive industry to attract investment in the sector.286 Transparent tax collection was further complicated by revisions to the tax law in 2005, 2009, and again in 2015, which confused businesses and often increased their tax burden. For example, a lack of clear information about a 2005 tax holiday, intended to encourage businesses to expand their operations and join the formal economy, resulted in some firms improperly applying and therefore not qualifying, or applying when they were not eligible, with the end result being firms having to pay several years of back taxes to the government all at once. Along with the back taxes, additional “fees” were paid to officials to avoid legal consequences. Further, in some cases, firms followed the correct procedures for getting the exemption, but did so through officials who did not have the authority to grant it.296</p><p>he military’s role in economic development was made more explicit by the 2005 DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations</p><p>As early as 2005, the World Bank noted that small groups of business people (mainly former jihadi commanders and other influential people with political connections) dominated trading activities and used their insider connections to acquire land, resolve disputes, obtain credit, and win contracts.195Afghans believed this reflected negatively on the central government, which was blamed for not ensuring the population’s welfare.</p><p>Many laws were promulgated in advance of the first parliamentary elections in September 2005, with the worry that enacting legislation would likely become more complicated once a sitting parliament was in place. By the end of 2005, a number of new or updated laws were awaiting examination and approval by the relevant ministries, including an industrial parks decree and laws on private investment, procurement, and business organizations.348 The customs code and the first hydrocarbon and minerals extraction laws governing the provision of mine and quarry licenses were also passed around the same time.349 USAID’s AEGP specifically focused on the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to help it establish a regulatory environment that was competitive for private sector growth and commerce, based on free market principles.350 The first legislation regarding competition policy for a specific sector was the Telecommunications Law, supported by USAID AEGP and presented to President Karzai’s cabinet in August 2005. The law sought to assist the rapidly developing telecommunications sector, historically a government monopoly, by including provisions for foreign and domestic private investment and eliminating unnecessary regulations and bureaucratic procedures.351 The telecommunications sector was widely considered one of Afghanistan’s success stories, in part because of these initial steps.</p><p>With the September 2005 parliamentary elections, the international community judged the Bonn process to have been successfully completed. Many Afghans, however, were not seeing the promised fruits of electoral democracy. As the nascent insurgency grew, security deteriorated, mainly in the south and the east, but occasionally in Kabul.</p><p><em>September 18, 2005</em>Democracy and Afghanistan More than six million Afghans turn out to vote for the Wolesi Jirga (Council of People), the Meshrano Jirga (Council of Elders), and local councils. Considered the most democratic elections ever in Afghanistan, nearly half those casting ballots are women, viewed as a sign of political progress in a highly patriarchal and conservative society. Sixty-eight out of 249 seats are set aside for female members of Afghanistan’s lower house of parliament and 23 out of 102 are reserved in the upper house.</p><p> In 2006, the United States began discussing ways to tackle corruption, although serious efforts were not undertaken until 2009.19</p><p>In 2006, the Afghan Beverage Industries, the company that produced Cristal Water, was the first Afghan company to win a contract to supply bottled water to the U.S. military. In 2016, the company signed a bottling agreement with PepsiCo Inc. to manufacture and distribute PepsiCo products in Afghanistan.7</p><p>In the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, donors agreed to increase the proportion of funds that were provided on-budget, as well as to provide more predictable and long-term funding</p><p>In January 2006, the United States and its donor partners convened the International Conference on Afghanistan in London to reaffirm support for the nation and establish a path forward. Conference attendees signed the Afghanistan Compact, a new five-year partnership of the Afghan government and the international community in which security became the central focus, followed by governance, rule of law, economic governance, and social development. The economic governance and private sector development objectives included increasing the ratio of domestic revenue to GDP by 8 percent over the five-year period, simplifying investment laws and regulations, strengthening banking supervision, and reducing transit times for imports and exports. Due to concerns about the spike in opium poppy cultivation,The compact tasked the Afghan government with developing a prioritized and detailed national development strategy and providing regular reporting on the use of donor assistance.197 To meet this requirement, the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) was issued in 2006, followed by the full ANDS in 2008. In response to criticisms over the limited buy-in to previous national strategies, the ANDS was developed over two years through an extensive consultative process in which a total of 17,000 individuals from government ministries, the parliament, provincial councils, civil society, international donors, and the private sector in all 34 provinces participated. The ANDS reaffirmed, albeit with greater specificity, the theme of the previous development strategies: Sustained economic growth depends on a vibrant private sector facilitated by a strong enabling environment for private sector growth and robust domestic and foreign investment. Although government officials emphasized that the ANDS was Afghanistan’s own roadmap for development, it also fulfilled the technical function of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which made Afghanistan eligible for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative of the IMF and World Bank.19</p><p>The fiber optic ring network, which will serve as the backbone of the telecommunications sector when fully completed, was launched in 2006 with support from the World Bank. While the initial phases of the project are complete and most of the network has been installed, with 25 of 34 provincial capitals connected to the backbone, not all of it is operational. Security issues delayed completion of portions of the network, especially between Herat and Maimana.339 The remaining nine provincial capitals will be connected under a follow-on project called Digital Central Asia-South Asia, </p><p>Many observers consider 2006 the tipping point when it became increasingly clear that Afghanistan was not a post-conflict state. Although there were concerns as early as 2003 that development progress was uneven and security conditions were deteriorating, it was not until 2006—when alarming levels of insecurity, insurgent activity, and poppy production could not be ignored— when significantly more resources began to flow from the United States into Afghanistan in an attempt to stabilize the country.</p><p>By 2006, it was clear Afghanistan was not a post-conflict state. As the insurgency grew and security deteriorated, Afghans also began to express dissatisfaction with their economic situation, which was further exacerbated by the 2007–2008 global food crisis. In response, the United States and its allies increased their humanitarian and development assistance. U.S. agencies began a series of enterprise development initiatives aiming at expanding markets, developing a technically skilled workforce, increasing access to capital, creating jobs, promoting investment, and developing domestic products to become more competitive with imports. During this period, the Department of Defense (DOD) began to engage more significantly in private sector development in two key ways: (1) the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), which was intended to improve short-term security through quick-impact projects such as micro grants, and (2) the Afghan First procurement initiative, an explicit policy for contracting with Afghan companies to ensure more of the money donors spent on goods would remain in Afghanistan, rather than going to Pakistan, China, Turkey, and other countries. </p><p>During this period, DOD also began to engage more significantly in private sector development through two main vehicles. The Commanders Emergency Response Program, developed in Iraq for short-term stabilization activities and subsequently introduced in Afghanistan, began giving micro grants to enterprises. To further support Afghan businesses, the Afghan First procurement policy was announced by Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry in 2006, then codified in the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The policy was intended to create jobs and promote the Afghan economy by awarding contracts to Afghan companies.202 Both CERP and Afghan First were to become much more significant in the following years, and are discussed in the next section of this report. </p><p><em>July 2006</em>A Bloody Resurgence Violence increases across the country during the summer months, with intense fighting erupting in the south in July. The number of suicide attacks quintuples from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006, while remotely detonated bombings more than double, to 1,677. Despite a string of recent election successes, some experts blame a faltering central government for the spike in attacks. “As with most insurgencies, the critical precondition [to the Afghan insurgency] is the collapse of governance,” says Afghanistan expert Seth G. Jones. Jones and other experts point to the many Afghans who lack basic services, the government’s difficultly setting up its police forces, and the lack of international forces to assist with security.</p><p>In 2006, USAID started providing direct support to enterprises by launching the Afghanistan Small and Medium Enterprise Development (ASMED) project, which provided grants and technical assistance to new and existing businesses and business associations, through partnerships in which the partner had to provide at least 50 percent of the funds. Small and medium enterprises were envisioned to be “a major driver of Afghanistan’s economic development.”201 ASMED also supported business development services providers, which were intended to be market-oriented companies that would provide business advisory services to Afghan firms on a fee basis. </p><p>To support the objective of increasing exports, the Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan (EPAA) was established in 2006, with GIZ technical and financial support, as part of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. EPAA’s purpose was to help turn enterprises “into internationally successful operators by identifying new international opportunities, markets, and partner[s].”203</p><p>The arbitration and mediation laws, a set of laws which attempted to establish a legal mechanism for dispute resolution outside of court, were an especially poor fit for Afghanistan. Based on international experience with alternative dispute resolution, these laws were intended to assist foreign investors. However, the laws inadequately considered the existence of shuras and jirgas, which held a position of power and respect within Afghan society that the formal court system lacked. When President Karzai signed the laws into effect in January 2007 while the parliament was in recess, he reinforced the widespread perception that laws were being brought in from foreign experts without engaging or consulting with the Afghan people</p><p>For example, the review stated that trucks carrying melons from northern Mazar-e Sharif to markets south of the mountains could be stopped and illegally taxed up to 20 times, and concluded that “an inherently weak institutional setting, such as currently exists within the Afghan government, cannot prevent ‘informal’ taxes and corruption</p><p><em>November 2006</em>Cracks in the Coalition At the NATO summit in Riga, rifts emerge among member states on troop commitments to Afghanistan. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer sets a target of 2008 for the Afghan National Army to begin to take control of security. “I would hope that by 2008 we will have made considerable progress,” he says, “with a <a href="http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061128a.htm">more stable political architecture in place</a>, and with a strong interface between NATO and the civilian agencies and effective, trusted Afghan security forces gradually taking control.” Leaders of the twenty-six countries agree to remove some national restrictions on how, when, and where forces can be used. But friction continues. With violence against nongovernmental aid workers increasing, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticizes NATO countries in late 2007 for not sending more soldiers. “Our progress in Afghanistan is real but it is fragile,” Gates says. “At this time, many allies are unwilling to share the risks, commit the resources, and follow through on collective commitments to this mission and to each other. As a result, we risk allowing what has been achieved in Afghanistan to slip away.”</p><p>In 2007, for instance, OPIC financed the establishment of Afghan Growth Finance (AGF), a non-bank subsidiary of the Washington-based Small Enterprise Assistance Funds, to reach out to Afghan-owned companies. The same year, USAID established the Afghan Rural Finance Company, expecting it to become an independent self-sufficient financial services provider. USAID also provided support to the microfinance sector by providing financial and technical support to microfinance institutions and the Microfinance Investment Facility of Afghanistan, which was established under the leadership of the World Bank.</p><p>The first major mining sites targeted by the Afghan government and its international supporters were the Mes Aynak copper deposits south of Kabul and the Hajigak iron ore deposits in Bamyan Province. With support from the World Bank, Mes Aynak was tendered in 2007 and awarded to the Metallurgical Group Corporation of China in 2008. Extraction has been delayed by insecurity, but also by low international commodity prices, the complexity of planning operations, debate over how to document and preserve a Buddhist archaeological site situated above the copper deposits, and the need to relocate local communities. The contract contains unusually high royalty payments, as well as extensive commitments by MCC for construction of supporting infrastructure, including roads, power plants, and training institutions. Some observers feel MCC is content to wait to begin extraction, with the intention to eventually renegotiate the contract.559 The Hajigak iron mine tender was released in 2010, but, although two Indian companies were selected the following year, an agreement remains elusive due, in part, to regional politics.560</p><p>Although minerals were mentioned in both the U.S. and Afghan government strategies from 2002, early U.S. assistance in the extractives sector was overshadowed by other priorities. There were few major developments until May 2008, when the rights to exploit the copper deposits at Aynak, one of the world’s largest unexploited copper deposits, were granted to the Metallurgical Group Corporation of China for a bid of $808 million, against which, as of 2016, MCC had only paid the first $80 million installment. MCC also committed to investing $2.9 billion for infrastructure over five years.204 At the time, the Afghan government estimated that royalties, direct and indirect taxes, and other fees from developing Aynak would provide more than $200 million in annual revenue.205 With other potential mining sites anticipated, this was seen as a test case for the tender process. </p><p>The contracting process for Mes Aynak, one of the largest untapped copper deposits in the world and Afghanistan’s first major mining tender, is a good exampleThe $2.9 billion contract, the largest single foreign investment in Afghanistan to date, was awarded to the Metallurgical Group Corporation of China in 2008 after a short bidding process. A year later, the Minister of Mines, Mohammad Ibrahim Adel, was accused of accepting a $30 million bribe to favor MCC over its competitors.372 As a minister, Adel was immune from investigation at the time and has since retired, and the issue remains unresolved. Poor or nonexistent recordkeeping of the tender process within MOMP, and the ministry’s refusal to release the Aynak contract document to the public until 2015, only furthered public suspicion.373 Further, in the years after the award of the Aynak contract, other mining contracts have been awarded to close relatives of politicians and government officials, in spite of prohibitions outlined in the 2009 Minerals Law.374 For example, the contract for the Ghori cement factory was awarded to the brothers of prominent politicians. (For more details, see Sell-Off of Ghori Cement, page 100.) The major mining sites of Mes Aynak in Logar Province and Hajigak in Bamyan Province are part of the National Resource Corridors Program, which is a plan to develop the mines in tandem with their supporting infrastructure, including roads and railways, which will in turn generate and support other local economic activity.375 However, this is a process that will require significant foreign private investment and effort from the Afghan government to plan and implement. Currently, both mining sites have been in limbo for several years due to a combination of insecurity and the fall in international commodity prices. In addition to the two major mining sites of Mes Aynak and Hajigak, Afghanistan has extensive smaller or artisanal mining activity, which has the potential to create wealth and employment. However, medium and small mines continue to experience “industrial-scale looting” by strongmen and well-connected individuals.376 In becoming a candidate for EITI in 2010, Afghanistan signaled its commitment to design and implement a transparency process that includes requiring companies to disclose beneficial ownership (any person or entity holding 10 percent or more of company shares), provide</p><p>With an increasing awareness that security was deteriorating and many of the reconstruction efforts were stalling, in 2008 the Bush administration undertook reviews of both military and civilian efforts.</p><p>By 2008, the banking sector had grown to include 15 licensed commercial banks, with 58 percent growth in deposits and 84 percent growth in loans.384 The banking sector had also started becoming profitable due to increases in both interest and noninterest incomes, the latter including fees and other service charges.385 IN 2002 Afghanistan’s financial system consisted solely of the central bank, two state-owned commercial banks, and four state-owned development banks, each of which had essentially ceased operations and could not perform the functions required to support a modern, market economy</p><p>In addition, according to the 2008 Asia Foundation (TAF) annual perceptions survey, Afghans felt a “higher level of dissatisfaction with the economic situation,” and the proportion of respondents who said they were “less prosperous than one year ago” increased from 26 percent in 2006 to 36 percent in 2008. Respondents identified unemployment, high prices, and the poor economy as the biggest problems facing the country.189 Fearing that high prices resulting from the 2007–2008 global food crisis could further fuel anger toward the U.S.-backed Afghan government and boost recruitment by the Taliban, the United States and other donors increased their humanitarian and development assistance.190 In September 2008, USAID launched the Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture (AVIPA) program, a $33 million voucher program to address the shortage of wheat, whose budget rose to $60 million as its scope expanded between November 2008 and May 2009.191 While initially designed to provide wheat seed and fertilizers to farmers in the drought-affected areas of the country, AVIPA shifted toward implementing agriculture-related stabilization activities—for example, cash for work such as clearing of irrigation canals, small grants for farm equipment, and provision of agriculture inputs—in the increasingly insecure southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. At the U.S. military’s request and in preparation for an anticipated troop surge, another five-yearplanned agriculture project was canceled and USAID was asked to extend AVIPA and be ready to implement stabilization activities as part of the “clear, hold, and build” process.192 This was one of many instances where USAID came under pressure to align its efforts with the military’s short-term stabilization and counterinsurgency activities.</p><p><em>August 22, 2008</em>Collateral Killings Mount Afghan and UN investigations find that errant fire from a U.S. gunship killed dozens of Afghan civilians in the Shindand District of western Herat Province, drawing condemnation from President Hamid Karzai and bolstering Taliban claims that coalition forces are unable to protect the population. U.S. military officials dispute the death toll in this incident as well as claims that a separate incident in Farah Province left as many as 140 civilians dead. After being named top U.S. commander in Afghanistan in mid-2009, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal orders an overhaul of U.S. air strike procedures. “We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories, but suffering strategic defeats, by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people,” the general writes.</p><p>Between 2008 and 2011, U.S. government agencies reported awarding $654.4 million in contracts directly to 214 Afghan companies. The majority of the contracts were in construction, followed by commodities and services.739 While in theory this represented money going into the Afghan economy, Afghan First’s impact on employment cannot be assessed because of the lack of a suitable methodology, accurate data from the field, and standard definitions of employment.74</p><p>CERP guidelines initially prohibited funding of private businesses, but starting in 2009, an exception was made for micro grants.234 The 2009 guidelines set the ceiling for micro grants at $2,500, although greater amounts were allowed with approvals at progressively higher levels of command. The limits were later increased to allow grants greater than $30,000 with the approval of the USFOR-A commander.235 Micro grants were for the explicit purpose of increasing economic activity, particularly in areas where small businesses had suffered because of insurgent violence. The extremely small percentage (0.44 percent) of overall CERP funds that explicitly supported private sector development initiatives was provided through these micro grants.23</p><p>USAID’s Trade Accession and Facilitation for Afghanistan (TAFA) project (November 2009 to November 2012) and its successor TAFA II (November 2012 to August 2013) were intended to support the development of Afghanistan’s economy “by fulfilling the trade potential of its strategic location on the historic Silk Road.”222 The projects helped with trade policy liberalization (mainly supporting Afghan accession to the WTO), customs reform, and trade facilitation.223 TAFA and TAFA II assisted in this complex process by helping the Afghans build public institutional capacity for creating legislative reform, and increasing coordination and cooperation both within the government and between the public and private sectors.224 Specific achievements included helping the Afghan government to negotiate and implement a number of formal regional trade and transit agreements with its neighbors, including the critical Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement, an updated version of the 1965 Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement, which granted land-locked Afghanistan the rights to import goods passing through Pakistani seaports duty-free.225</p><p>The U.S. government continued to build the Afghan government’s capacity to act as steward of the economy through USAID’s third economic governance program, the $92 million Economic Growth and Governance Initiative (EGGI). Between 2009 and 2013, EGGI’s overarching goal was to enhance the Afghan government’s “capacity to develop and sustain a market environment that supports responsible economic management and fiscal sustainability.”226 In the second year of the project, a critical external assessment found that EGGI’s work did not provide an “integrated and coherent program or policy framework” that would have contributed to a better functioning private sector.227 As a consequence, EGGI’s scope during its final two years was significantly reduced, and was focused mainly on helping the government generate revenue streams. At the same time, because strengthening customs collections increasingly became a priority in light of the need for the Afghan government to generate more revenue in anticipation of the U.S. drawdown, USAID’s TAFA project focused, in part, on supporting improved customs collection. </p><p><em>February 17, 2009</em>Obama Recommits to Afghanistan New U.S. president Barack Obama announces plans to send seventeen thousand more troops to the war zone. Obama reaffirms campaign statements that Afghanistan is the more important U.S. front against terrorist forces. He says the United States will stick to a timetable to draw down most combat forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. As of January 2009 the Pentagon has thirty-seven thousand troops in Afghanistan, roughly divided between U.S. and NATO commands. Reinforcements focus on countering a “resurgent” Taliban and stemming the flow of foreign fighters over the Afghan-Pakistan border in the south. Speaking on the troop increase, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates describes the original mission in Afghanistan as “too broad” and calls for establishing limited goals such as preventing and limiting terrorist safe havens.</p><p>In 2009, USTDA launched the Regional Infrastructure and Trade Initiative in South Asia, which, while primarily focused on western Pakistan, was also intended to benefit Afghanistan in resolving complications in transportation logistics and trade. USTDA, in coordination with the State Department, was also active in assisting with regional integration across South Asia</p><p><em>March 27, 2009</em>A New American Strategy President Obama announces a new strategy for the war effort, linking success in Afghanistan to a stable Pakistan. The core goal of the strategy, as outlined in an interagency white paper, is “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.” The strategy urges the passage of increased aid to Pakistan and a strict standard of measuring progress in fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Plans also call for the deployment of an additional four thousand soldiers to help train the Afghan army and police force. President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan welcomes the strategy, stating that the plan will bring Afghanistan and the international community closer to success.</p><p>TFBSO began its minerals program in 2009 In 2010, TFBSO estimated the potential value of the country’s mineral deposits at $908 billion, a figure which was rounded upward to $1 trillion and widely cited.557 Also in 2010, Afghanistan joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as a candidate (For more details, see Afghanistan and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, page 76.) The next year, USGS and TFBSO completed an extensive survey of Afghanistan’s mineral deposits using sophisticated hyperspectral technology, making Afghanistan the only country in the world that has been completely mapped geologically.558</p><p><em>May 11, 2009</em>Command Change Secretary of Defense Robert Gates replaces the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David D. McKiernan, with counterinsurgency and special operations guru Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal. McKiernan’s removal comes eleven months after he assumed command of NATO forces in Afghanistan. Gates says the Pentagon needs “fresh thinking” and “fresh eyes” on the Afghanistan war at a time when many analysts say operations there are spiraling out of control. Reports indicate that the appointment of McChrystal is intended to bring a more “aggressive and innovative” approach to the Afghan war effort in tune with a more focused counterinsurgency strategy.</p><p><em>July 2009</em>New Strategy, Old Battles U.S. Marines launch a major offensive in southern Afghanistan, representing a major test for the U.S. military’s new counterinsurgency strategy. The offensive, involving four thousand Marines, is launched in response to a growing Taliban insurgency in the country’s southern provinces, especially Helmand Province. The operation focuses on restoring government services, bolstering local police forces, and protecting civilians from Taliban incursion. By August 2009 U.S. forces are to number between sixty thousand and sixty-eight thousand.</p><p><em>November 2009</em>Afghan Presidential Election After more than two months of uncertainty following a disputed presidential election on August 20, President Hamid Karzai wins another term. The August 20 election, which pitted Karzai against top contenders Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, was marred by fraud allegations. An investigation by the UN-backed Electoral Complaints Commission finds Karzai won only 49.67 percent of the vote, below the 50 percent-plus-one threshold needed to avoid a runoff. Under international pressure, Karzai agrees to a runoff vote on November 7. But a week before the runoff, Karzai’s main rival Abdullah pulls out, and Karzai is declared the winner. Concerns over Karzai’s legitimacy grow, and the United States and other international partners call for improved governance. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ties all future civilian aid to greater efforts by the Karzai administration to combat corruption.</p><p><em>December 1, 2009</em>Obama’s Afghan Surge Nine months after renewing the U.S. commitment to the Afghan war effort, President Obama announces a major escalation of the U.S. mission. In a nationally televised speech, the president commits an additional thirty thousand forces to the fight, on top of the sixty-eight thousand in place. These forces, Obama says, “will increase our ability to train competent Afghan Security Forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.” For the first time in the eight-year war effort, a time frame is put on the U.S. military presence, as Obama sets July 2011 as the start of a troop drawdown. But the president does not detail how long a drawdown will take. Obama says U.S. national interests are linked to success in the Afghan war effort, and argues that this temporary surge will force Afghan political and military institutions to assume responsibility for their own affairs.</p><p>6 In December 2009, after a series of further reviews, President Obama presented a strategy that was intended to represent a break with the past and give proper attention and resources to what he had previously called “the right war.”207 The Obama administration’s strategy to stem the tide of the insurgency included a large troop surge and its development counterpart, the so-called “civilian uplift.” The surge was supported by massive increases in funding: Governance and development funding alone increased by 58 percent from FY 2009 to 2010, despite widespread reports and analysis that suggested spending at the previous, lower levels of funding was already problematic, in terms of both accountability and budget execution.208 For example, the doubling of AVIPA’s budget from $150 million to $300 million was done over the objections of USAID leadership, who were concerned that trying to spend that much money would be “ineffective and wasteful.”209 On top of development funding, massive construction of bases and facilities for the international military and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) also put money into the economy, especially the construction and </p><p>a 2009 series of media reports on how U.S. contracting practices were unwittingly funding the Taliban was reinforced by a report from the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC).241 CWC noted the vulnerabilities that resulted from U.S. government agencies’ lack of sufficient staff and capacity, disparate contracting mechanisms, and weak planning and interagency coordination.</p><p>The contested 2009 Afghan presidential election—after which Senator John Kerry and Ambassador Eikenberry stepped in to resolve the conflict between President Karzai and challenger Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who each claimed victory—got the Afghan government’s relationship with the new Obama administration off to a rocky start. Tensions between the two governments further grew after recurring U.S. complaints about Afghan corruption, and were exacerbated by the increasing sense of uncertainty created by the preparations for the drawdown of international forces, the lingering effects of the global recession, and the collapse of Kabul Bank. </p><p>In 2009, shortly before U.S. spending peaked, concerns began to surface about where the money was going. The 2009 report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting and media reports of U.S. contracting practices that unwittingly funded the Taliban led to increasing concerns about contract oversight.741 Making contracting “commanders’ business,” the COIN Contracting Guidance issued in 2010 by USFOR-A and ISAF Commander General David Petraeus directed military and civilian personnel of NATO, ISAF, and USFOR-A to hire Afghans first, buy Afghan products, and build Afghan capacity, but also highlighted the necessity of establishing systems and standard databases to ensure contracts were not awarded to malign actors.742 Also in 2010, the U.S. Embassy established an Afghan First Working Group to coordinate U.S. and international military and civilian efforts in implementing the Afghan First policy. The same year, DOD established a vendor vetting cell, mainly vetting contracts equal to or greater than $100,000. However, the cell didn’t routinely vet subcontractors, even when their contracts exceeded that threshold.</p><p>In December 2009, President Obama presented a strategy intended to represent a break with the past and give attention and resources to what he had previously called “the right war.” The administration’s strategy to stem the tide of the insurgency included a large troop surge and its development counterpart, the “civilian uplift.” The surge was supported by massive increases in funding: Governance and development funding alone increased by 58 percent from FY 2009 to FY 2010. However, the simultaneous announcement of the 2009 surge and the 2011–2014 drawdown introduced a cloud of uncertainty that hung over most of the period. During this era of counterinsurgency, USAID came under greater pressure to align its programming and geographical focus with the U.S. military’s stabilization and counterinsurgency priorities as part of a unified U.S. response. DOD also increased its direct involvement in private sector development through CERP micro grants, strengthening the Afghan First procurement initiative, and introducing the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) from Iraq. TFBSO was critical of USAID’s traditional development approach and saw itself as more nimble and expeditionary. The run-up to the 2014 transition was characterized by great uncertainty due to the drawdown in international forces and the upcoming Afghan presidential election. Economic activity declined due to a combination of reduced international spending and uncertainty about the political and security outlook, manifesting itself in a plunge in property prices, a leveling or decline in wages, and increased capital and human flight as Afghans sought a safe haven for their money and themselves. USAID shifted its focus to a few high-capital, highimpact foundational investments and the increased sustainability of economic growth and Afghan government institutions. </p><p>logistics sectors. At the same time, however, the simultaneous announcement of the 2009 surge and the 2011–2014 drawdown and transition introduced a heavy cloud of uncertainty that hung over most of the period. This was also the era of counterinsurgency, which provided an intellectual underpinning to development efforts with its mantra of “the people are the prize.”210 The 2009 Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan noted that U.S. government efforts “must focus on the people of Afghanistan” and the need to “shift our focus to the Afghan population.” The plan included sustainable jobs, agricultural markets, and cross-border access for commerce as three of its “transformative effects,” asserting that “significant growth in jobs can provide a viable alternative to violence or criminality, ‘outbid’ the Taliban, and promote a sense of progress.”211 More effort was made to get aid to the subnational level due to the belief that most development funding, regardless of sector, had not yet made it out of Kabul and the primary cities. In trying to align its programming and geographical focus with the U.S. military’s stabilization and counterinsurgency priorities as part of the whole-ofgovernment approach, USAID’s portfolio contained quick impact activities that aimed to “provide immediate employment and income in insecure areas, promote alternative livelihood to poppy production and insurgent activities, and address grievances and sources of conflict with communities.”212 Projects such as USAID’s ASMED, which had been started in 2006 to provide enterpriselevel support in four provinces, were directed to work in insecure districts throughout the country as part of the COIN strategy. In addition to COIN, the other big policy shift during this time was the formulation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AF-PAK) concept. The creation of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) office within State in 2009 and the appointment of senior diplomat Richard Holbrooke to head it were based on the belief that it was necessary to consider the two countries within one policy. The AF-PAK policy reinforced the regional focus, and the New Silk Road (NSR) initiative, which was articulated by Secretary of State Clinton in a July 2011 speech in Chennai, India, further supported it. Clinton described the founding principles of the NSR: An Afghanistan firmly embedded in the economic life of a thriving South and Central Asia would be able to attract new sources of foreign investment and connect to markets abroad, including hundreds of millions of potential new customers in India. And, increasing trade across the region would open up new sources of raw material, energy, and agricultural products, creating more jobs in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.213 The NSR initiative provided the most explicit description of the U.S. regional vision for Afghanistan, which included reducing barriers to trade—such as poor infrastructure, bureaucratic hurdles, and poor border-crossing facilities—and upgrading trade policies so that “goods, capital, and people can flow more easily across borders.”214 Looking Ahead to the Transition Because the drawdown had been announced at the same time as the surge, this period was also marked by the international community’s engagement with the Afghan government to prepare for the phased departure of international military forces, beginning in July 2011 and concluding at the end of 2014, when most international combat troops were to be out of the country. While the troop drawdown received the most attention, it was clear to all that civilian development spending would likewise be reduced. For example, while the USAID Afghanistan mission’s proposed budget for FY 2010 was the largest of any USAID country program, ever, by October 2010 mission management was told to prepare for “significant funding reductions for 2011.”215 These “draconian budget reductions” and the shift to a “transition-centric approach” were ascribed, in part, to U.S. domestic politics, including declining support for the Afghan conflict.216</p><p>Some private telecom companies worry that the sector’s success will result in the “golden goose effect.” The sector has been one of the largest tax contributors to the Afghan government, accounting for about 45 percent of the revenue from the Large Taxpayer Offices in 2010–2011 and a significant part of the government’s total revenue.341 In 2015, a presidential decree levied an additional 10 percent telecom provider service tax, which affected the purchase of top-up cards and other services for mobile phone users.342 According to MOF, these new taxes provided a 21 percent boost to the national budget.343 Yet, telecom providers already paid mandatory annual fees, business receipt taxes, and frequency spectrum fees, with a total tax burden of 25 percent.344 Because the Afghan government had only a small pool of properly licensed and regulated industries from which it could extract taxes, the telecom companies believed that, in such a target-poor environment, the industry was being unfairly squeezed to generate revenue for the government.34</p><p>The majority of domestic investment occurred in the construction industry, especially during the 2009–2012 surge, driven in part by the construction boom that resulted from the massive of inflows of international funding. Otherwise, investment was limited due primarily to ongoing uncertainty and insecurity, poor economic governance, and the lack of a comparative advantage in potential industries. </p><p>DOD’s most direct and large-scale engagement with the private sector in Afghanistan was through TFBSO, which was created by DOD in Iraq in 2006 and expanded to Afghanistan in 2010. While TFBSO was initially conceived as a group of “expeditionary” business specialists intended to improve DOD’s contracting practices and facilitate contracts with local vendors in Iraq, by 2010 it had expanded to take on a broader economic stabilization role, with the mission to “promote economic stabilization in order to reduce violence, enhance stability, and restore economic normalcy” in Afghanistan.745 A former TFBSO senior official noted that TFBSO was critical of USAID’s “development approach” to the private sector, such as providing grants, and viewed its role as a “bridge to the private sector” or “a private equity firm,” by promoting private sector investments in key sectors, such as cashmere and natural gas</p><p>Common usage of the term “expeditionary economics” arose from a 2010 Foreign Affairs article that called for the military to actively engage in private sector development in conflict environments as “part of any successful three-legged strategy of invasion, stabilization or pacification, and economic reconstruction.”747 This approach advocated a dominant role for the military because, as the best-resourced institution, it could quickly deploy and get results in non-permissive environments. Advocacy for expeditionary economics often contains implicit and explicit criticisms of traditional U.S. aid programs, which are seen as sluggish, ineffective, top-down, and not sufficiently focused on the task at hand: stability.</p><p><em>June 23, 2010</em>Gen. McChrystal Relieved from Afghan Command Gen. Stanley McChrystal is relieved of his post as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, following a controversial <em><a href="http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-runaway-general-20100622?RS_show_page=0">Rolling Stone</a></em> article in which he and his aides were quoted criticizing the administration. President Barack Obama nominates Gen. David Petraeus, head of the military’s Central Command and architect of the 2007 Iraq surge, to replace McChrystal. The change in command comes at a crucial time in the war, as additional surge forces are scheduled to arrive ahead of a critical operation in Kandahar. Obama emphasizes that his acceptance of McChrystal’s resignation does not reflect disagreement over the counterinsurgency strategy he had helped shape. “We are in full agreement about our strategy,” says Obama. “This is a change in personnel, not a change in policy.”</p><p>The 2010 TFBSO and USGS assessment of Afghanistan’s mineral deposits, estimated to have a potential value of $908 billion, helped to build enthusiasm for the extractives sector, especially given the interest in increasing Afghan government revenue in the run-up to 2014.239 TFBSO was a temporary agency, and from 2011 onward there was uncertainty about whether it would be reauthorized each year, which made planning and implementation more challenging.240 Also beginning in 2011, TFBSO was required by Congress to submit an annual plan to demonstrate the successful transition of activities by 2014.</p><p>The 2010 Kabul Bank collapse demonstrated just how fragile the banking sector. In the finance sector, the 2010 collapse of Kabul Bank sent shockwaves through the economy and undermined faith in government institutions.230 The aftermath of the collapse negatively affected U.S. technical assistance and support to building the private sector enabling environment; for example, USAID prohibited working with the national bank, DAB, due to its role in Kabul Bank’s collapse.231</p><p>The relationship was further articulated in a 2010 speech by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton when she spoke of the need to better integrate the three Ds: defense, diplomacy, and development.15</p><p>In 2010, the donors further agreed to a target of 50 percent of funding to be provided on-budget, with 75 percent of all funds aligned to the Afghan government’s priorities</p><p>The 2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), replacing the 1965 Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement, has not resolved the many trade-related tensions between the two countries, including transshipment of goods and access to Pakistan’s roads for Afghan vehicles. </p><p>2010 Feb washington post breaks news of widespread corruption at he Kabul bank, the largest in afghanistan. </p><p>The London and Kabul Conferences of January and July 2010, respectively, marked the start of a new phase during which the Afghan government was to incrementally assume responsibility for its own security and development initiatives by 2014—also the year in which the next Afghan presidential election was to be held.217 The Afghan government introduced a list of redesigned National Priority Programs (NPP) that were intended to serve as a focused implementation plan for the ANDS.218 The NPPs contained the Afghan government’s first small and medium enterprise strategy, the Integrated Trade and Small and Medium Enterprise Support Facility, which was to serve as the roadmap for “strategic and sequential development of private sector in Afghanistan.”219 The strategy consisted of four components: improving the business climate, increasing trade, developing private enterprises, and reforming the lead ministry, the MOCI. The small and medium enterprise section of the Private Sector Development NPP was mainly informed by the small and medium enterprise strategy that was developed in 2009, with support from the USAID ASMED project.220 The strategy identified six priority sectors—agribusiness, carpets, cashmere, construction materials, gemstones, and marble—based on a number of criteria, including labor-intensiveness, high growth potential, availability of locally sourced raw materials, competitiveness, and involvement of a large number of domestic firms.It wasn’t until 2011, however, that action plans were drafted to identify sector-specific bottlenecks and ways to resolve them, as well as proposed actions to move Afghanistan up the value chain within each sector. </p><p>Prior to its collapse in 2010, Kabul Bank was the largest banking service provider in Afghanistan. Its failure, and the subsequent $825 million bailout by the Afghan government, represented approximately 5 to 6 percent of GDP, making it one of the largest banking failures in the world, relative to GDP.400 Kabul Bank was established in 2004, a year after DAB was resurrected and several crucial banking laws were enacted. It later emerged that there were fundamental problems with Kabul Bank supervision and regulation due to DAB’s lack of capacity and political influence surrounding the bank. Kabul Bank’s shareholders’ and supervisors’ personal, financial, and criminal backgrounds weren’t thoroughly reviewed by DAB or vetted through the Ministry of Interior as part of the license application review process. Moreover, DAB didn’t conduct any onsite examinations until 2007, two and one-half years after Kabul Bank started operations.401 Kabul Bank established a sophisticated and fraudulent embezzlement system based on dual financial records: one set of records was to satisfy regulators and the other was to keep track of the real distribution of bank funds. Through this system, the bank provided funds to proxy borrowers and fabricated company documents and financial statements. The ultimate beneficiaries of this fraudulent system were large shareholders, related companies and individuals, and politically connected individuals. Over 92 percent of the bank’s loans, or approximately $861 million, were given to 19 related parties, consisting of companies and individuals.402 The bank also misappropriated funds through non-loan disbursements that included excessive expenses, investments in related businesses, fake capital injections, advanced payments of salaries and rent, salaries paid to nonexistent employees, inflated costs for assets and payments for fake assets, unjustifiable bonuses, and political contributions, including to President Karzai’s re-election campaign.403 While DAB officials conducted regular and special examinations of Kabul Bank between 2007 and 2010, during which they consistently raised concerns about the bank’s violations related to governance, loan files, and promotional incentives, they couldn’t detect the extent of the fraud. Even the external audit reports of Kabul Bank didn’t raise any red flags.404 In February 2010, a Washington Post article accused the bank of fraudulent lending practices, with loans to major shareholders that included the brothers of President Karzai, the Vice President, and many others, some of whom had purchased property in Dubai and Customers seek to withdraw money from Kabul Bank after large-scale corruption allegations in September 2010. (Agence France Presse photo by Massoud Hossaini) 84 | PROVIDING ACCESS TO FINANCE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION registered it under the bank chairman’s name.405 Additionally, the bank chairman and CEO had created hundreds of fake companies to which loans were granted. The loans were then transferred to individuals in Afghanistan through Shaheen Exchange in Dubai, a money transfer company owned by the bank’s shareholders. The bank’s chairman and CEO were actively using its funds in violation of Afghan banking laws. Activities such as the bank’s purchase of property in Dubai and the purchase and running of Afghan businesses by bank officials and board members were illegal. For example, Pamir Airways was a domestic airline that was owned and operated by the bank’s chairman. The airline’s license was revoked in 2011 following an air crash that killed 44 passengers. The investigation revealed that the plane’s registration had been forged to avoid safety inspections.406 In July 2010, as the result of a rift between bank chairman Sherkhan Farnood and CEO Khalilullah Ferozi, the chairman exposed the fraudulent activities of the bank to the U.S. Embassy, which eventually resulted in the firing of both executives. By then, the bank’s customer base had ballooned to one million Afghans, with a total of $1.3 billion in deposits. At the same time, the bank maintained an alarming loan to deposit ratio of 70 percent, which meant more than $900 million of its deposits were committed to mostly fraudulent loans.407 The news of the firing of the bank’s officials caused widespread panic among Afghans, who rushed to withdraw almost $500 million of the bank’s funds in a span of only a few days. DAB had to intervene as a lender of last resort to secure deposits and avoid a larger crisis.408 The New Kabul Bank was established in 2011 to inherit the “good assets”—those acquired legally by Kabul Bank—while the Kabul Bank Receivership inherited the “bad assets”—those that were acquired through fraudulent transactions. The receivership’s activities faced delays because of meddling and intimidation from politically connected figures. Since the establishment of the receivership, other than the imprisonment of the bank’s chairman and CEO, and despite presidential decrees offering incentives such as reduced prison time or interest rates, the recovery of funds, indictment, and imprisonment of other large debtors with political connections have been very slow. At one point in November 2015, news broke about the bank’s CEO becoming a major contributor to an Afghan government land development project. However, given the public attention and outcry, a few days later President Ghani declared the contract null and the CEO was reportedly back in prison. The Afghan government continues to find it challenging to recover money from debtors, especially from the chairman and CEO, because their assets are hidden under other people’s names.409</p><p><em>November 2010</em>Timetable for Security Transition At a summit in Lisbon, NATO member countries sign a declaration agreeing to hand over full responsibility for security in Afghanistan to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. The transition process is set to begin in July 2011, with local security forces taking over control in relatively stable provinces and cities. The initial handover is to coincide with the start of a drawdown in the one hundred thousand-strong contingent of U.S. troops deployed in Afghanistan, though the number of U.S. soldiers leaving is expected to be a token amount. But many in Afghanistan and in the West, including members of the Afghan parliament, are concerned about the ability of national forces to take over from international troops.</p><p>Starting in January 2011, USAID’s Land Reform in Afghanistan (LARA) project continued with some of the same objectives as its predecessor project LTERA, focusing on improving land and property rights through various legal, policy, and institutional reforms. However, unlike LTERA, LARA did not address privatization.228</p><p>The U.S. Trade Representative also highlighted regional integration, making the New Silk Road an important talking point in its 2011 annual Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) meeting. The New Silk Road initiative envisioned “an international network of economic and transit connections,” which would help “link and integrate Afghanistan with its neighbors and regional” partners.6</p><p>The fallout from the Kabul Bank collapse included a March 2011 Afghan presidential directive that U.S. advisors were no longer welcome at DAB</p><p><em>June 22, 2011</em>Obama Announces Troop Drawdown President Obama outlines a plan to withdraw thirty-three thousand troops by the summer of 2012—the surge troops sent in December 2009—including ten thousand by the end of 2011. Polls show a record number of Americans do not support the war, and Obama faces pressure from lawmakers, particularly Democrats, to sizably reduce U.S. forces in Afghanistan. After the surge troops leave, an estimated seventy thousand U.S. troops are scheduled to stay through at least 2014. Obama confirms that the U.S. is holding preliminary peace talks with the Taliban leadership. With reconciliation in mind, the UN Security Council days earlier splits a sanctions list between members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, making it easier to add and remove people and entities.</p><p>2011 Oct President Karzai suspends the talks with taliban following the September 20 assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the government’s chief negotiator, which Afghan officials blame on the Pakistan-based Haqqani network. The group denies it.</p><p><em>December 5, 2011</em>Bonn Conference Ten years after the first international conference that discussed Afghanistan’s political future, dozens of countries and organizations meet again in Bonn, Germany, to devise a roadmap of cooperation beyond the international troop withdrawal in 2014. Afghan President Hamid Karzai says the country will require $10 billion annually over the next decade to shore up security and reconstruction, and commits to tackling corruption in exchange for continued international assistance. The conference fails to achieve its objectives—to lay down a blueprint for Afghanistan's transition to a self-sustaining and secure government—as the insurgency continues to rage, and Pakistan, a crucial player, refuses to attend.</p><p>In this uncertain and contentious atmosphere, the international community and Afghanistan agreed to a set of commitments called the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) at a July 2012 donor’s conference in Tokyo. The international community committed to $16 billion in support to Afghanistan for four years—less money and fewer years than the Afghan government had hoped, but viewed as a commitment, albeit lukewarm, from the international community</p><p>The Afghan government’s 2012 Towards Self-Reliance strategy estimated that by 2020, minerals and hydrocarbons would contribute $650 million annually to government revenue, and that by 2025, that number would rise to $1.7 billion annually.561 These lofty projections, which did not foresee an imminent drop in international mineral prices and assumed a more permissive security environment, were factored into IMF and Afghan government forecasts for long-term economic growth, which failed to materialize. Mining revenues in 2016 were reported as $20 million, which accounted for only 0.3 percent of the government of Afghanistan’s $6.5 billion national budget that year.562</p><p><em>March 2012</em>Taliban Cancels Talks; U.S.-Afghan Tensions Flare In January, the Taliban strikes a deal to open an office in Qatar, a move toward peace talks that the United States sees as a crucial part of a political settlement to ensure a stable Afghanistan. But two months later, the Taliban suspends preliminary talks, accusing Washington of reneging on promises to take meaningful steps toward a prisoner swap. In February, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announces the Pentagon’s plan to conclude combat missions by as early as mid-2013 and shift to a primarily security assistance role in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, several incidents serve as blows to the international mission, including an accidental burning of Qurans by U.S. troops and allegations that a U.S. soldier murdered at least sixteen Afghan villagers. President Hamid Karzai demands that foreign troops be withdrawn from village outposts and confined to military bases, which analysts say would greatly accelerate the pace of transition from NATO to Afghan control.</p><p>Given the informal nature of much of the Afghan economy, all trade data must be taken as approximate. Afghanistan did not start reporting on this data until 2008, and through 2014, over half of all imports and exports that were reported were not classified as to type. </p><p>Despite this, the U.S. government continued to try to provide access to finance using new approaches, including USAID’s Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA), which was begun in 2011 to help the commercial and microfinance sectors meet a wide range of financial needs, including those of micro, small, and medium enterprises.232 In 2012, USAID initiated a loan guarantee program for four select financial institutions under its Development Credit Authority model, intended to help mitigate the risks associated with lending to small and medium enterprises.</p><p>As the United States and its allies tried to instill confidence in Afghans about their continued commitment to the country, in part by renaming the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) “Resolute Support” and referring to the U.S. “enduring presence,” Afghans showed their skepticism by reducing investment, curtailing spending, and moving their capital to safer havens outside the country. </p><p>GDP growth in 2013 was 2 percent, the lowest since 2004, which was then followed by 1.3 percent in 2014.245 Even before official indicators such as GDP were issued, informal observations of a plunge in property prices, leveling or decline in wages, and increased capital flight indicated a lack of confidence in the economy and confirmed the sense of foreboding. News reports from 2012 indicated that while real estate prices of large homes in Kabul were declining, villa prices in Dubai were rising as wealthy Afghans purchased multiple properties, often in cash.246 Analytical reports also indicated reductions in household discretionary spending on private schools and purchases of private vehicles.247 In 2014, Afghan and U.S. fears about the presidential election were realized when an impasse occurred similar to that which followed the 2009 election. This time, Dr. Abdullah and former Minister of Finance Ghani each declared himself the winner. The United States again stepped in to broker a political settlement out of fear Afghanistan could fall into civil war. A “National Unity Government” (NUG) was formed through the creation of an extra-constitutional position of Chief Executive, in which Abdullah would serve alongside Ghani, who was proclaimed president. </p><p>Concern about Afghan government revenue helped invigorate U.S. interest in the Afghan mining sector. While extractives had earlier been recognized as a potential source of growth, employment, and revenue, the sector was slow to get going. (For more details, see Extractives in Afghanistan, page 114.) In March 2013, USAID awarded its only mining-specific program, the $43 million 2013–2017 Mining Investment and Development for Afghanistan Sustainability (MIDAS) project, focused on helping the Afghan government build the capacity to manage mines throughout their lifecycle, especially through legal and regulatory reform. The U.S. government emphasis on “sustainability,” which was manifested, in part, by pressure on the Afghan government to increase taxes in order to replace foreign aid with another revenue stream, reinforced the existing uncertainty and pessimism about the drawdown that fostered a “last call” mentality</p><p>Upon taking office in 2014, President Ghani tried to dispel skepticism by insisting that WTO accession would “serve as a catalyst for domestic reforms and transformation to an effective and functioning market economy that attracts investment, creates jobs, and improves the welfare of the people of Afghanistan.”633 Amid concerns that “the benefits of World Trade Organization membership [could] come at a substantial cost,” Ghani’s rhetoric exacerbated feelings that the government was not providing adequate support for its businesses and people.6</p><p>TFBSO’s mission in Afghanistan ended in December 2014, concurrent with the security transition and withdrawal of U.S. troops. Between 2010 and 2014, TFBSO obligated more than $675 million for various projects in agriculture, banking, investment facilitation and business support, indigenous industries, energy, mining, and women’s advancement.748 While TFBSO implemented large-scale projects in natural gas and the extractive industry, this report focuses on their direct support to private enterprises that took place under TFBSO-defined project categories of investment facilitation and business support and indigenous industries, as highlighted in table 2. Another TFBSO initiative aimed at developing the commercial information technology (IT) sector by creating an IT incubator in Herat, where TFBSO believed there were a number of “experienced computer scientists.” The goal was to turn Herat into the “Bangalore of Afghanistan” by identifying promising Afghan startups and providing them with support, such as office space, internet access, and business advisory and consulting services, as well as connecting these companies with U.S. and international investors.754 After a TFBSO internal analysis of its program and its increasing familiarity with and adaptation to the realities of Afghanistan, it expanded the recipients of its business advisory services to include not only IT startups, but also more mature small to medium enterprises from other sectors, such as food processing, light manufacturing, and chemicals. The IT incubator was renamed as business accelerator.755 TFBSO reported that by the close of the program in 2014, 62 entrepreneurs and 13 companies (out of 34) graduated from the business accelerator.756 Some of the beneficiaries believed the initial support and networking services were beneficial, but others said TFBSO’s consultants provided Western-based marketing advice that could not be applied to traditional Afghan markets.757 The business accelerator was eventually dissolved in 2014, concurrent with the closure of TFBSO. By this time, TFBSO had awarded American University of Afghanistan with two grants to create and manage Business Innovation Hubs in Kabul and Herat. The hubs were to continue the business advisory program begun with the Herat incubator effort.758 By partnering with AUAF, the TFBSO team aimed to improve the long-term financial stability of the hubs and ensure their continuity after TFBSO’s termination. However, despite the introduction of a fee for formerly free advisory services, the hubs were unable to become selfsufficient, because of insufficient demand and staff who weren’t qualified.75 Because TFBSO didn’t consistently collect data and develop objective performance measures to monitor progress, it is not possible to assess TFBSO’s claims of job and revenue creation. A 2014 DOD-commissioned “economic impact assessment” projected that the combined effects of TFBSO projects alone would double Afghanistan’s GDP by 2025.764 However, that assessment was viewed by RAND as limited by TFBSO’s failure to collect performance data from the start</p><p>In 2009, cashmere was recognized by the Afghan government for its potential to create sustainable jobs and contribute to high-value exports. At that time, the two largest producers of cashmere were China and Mongolia, with Afghanistan the third-largest producer at 6 percent of global cashmere production. Afghanistan had 7.8 million cashmere-producing goats, but only 30 percent of them were harvested. Furthermore, Afghan cashmere was of an inferior quality and much of the exported Afghan cashmere was unprocessed, commanding a lower price in international markets. The Afghan government’s plan for the cashmere sector was to move the industry up the value chain, increase processing of raw cashmere, enable producers to obtain higher prices for the raw fiber, create sustainable jobs, and reduce the cost of inputs for the carpet and textile sector.769 While the majority of the cashmere goats were in Herat and Badakhshan Provinces, most of their wool was exported from Herat. Recognizing the importance of the cashmere sector, TFBSO primarily focused on creating a breeding farm to produce high-quality, light-colored cashmere that was in high demand in international markets. At the same time, TFBSO planned to add value to local processing and increase the return on exported cashmere by introducing new breeding and husbandry techniques to improve goat herds, harvesting, cleaning, and spinning activities, and connecting Afghan producers with international buyers. TFBSO predicted that, with these interventions, Afghanistan could increase its output of raw cashmere fiber by 1,000 tons annually, adding an estimated $13.5 million revenue to exports per year. TFBSO also anticipated that half of Afghanistan’s raw cashmere fiber could be domestically processed, rather than shipped abroad in its raw, low-value state.770 For this purpose, TFBSO obligated $2.3 million to Colorado State University (CSU) in 2013 to create a sustainable cashmere-producing farm of 2,000 goats in Herat. Some of these goats were flown in from Chianti, Italy, to breed with the native stock. The farm was intended to become the source of high-quality cashmere for the processing centers that had been established in Herat, with support from USAID-funded projects. Once completed, the farm was to be handed over to a private company. In 2015, CSU reported that it had completed construction, breeding, and training at the farm and laboratory. After failing to reach agreement with the Afghan Cashmere Manufacturers Association, the university located another Afghan company, the Noor Agro Group, willing to take over operations and management. The university was ultimately unable to facilitate a required memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock and the Noor Agro Group, putting the sustainability of the farm at risk, especially given the high cost of maintenance of the farm. This is an indication that TFBSO did not take sufficient measures to ensure a handover agreement was in place prior to setting up the farm. When SIGAR’s lessons learned team visited the goat farm in April 2016, the facilities appeared to be in operation. In a subsequent visit one year later, SIGAR auditors found the farm abandoned and stripped of all animals and equipment. MAIL officials told SIGAR they were not in contact with the Noor Agro Group and did not know what it had done with the facility.771</p><p><em>September 21, 2014</em>Ghani and Abdullah Agree to Unity Government Ashraf Ghani, the newly elected president, signs a <a href="https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/when-the-political-agreement-runs-out-on-the-future-of-afghanistans-national-unity-government/">power-sharing agreement</a> with his chief opponent, Abdullah Abdullah, who had mobilized thousands of protestors as he challenged the voting results. The agreement, brokered after intensive diplomacy by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, establishes the role of chief executive officer for Abdullah. While the agreement staves off civil unrest, it ushers in protracted government dysfunction as Ghani and Abdullah tussle over their respective prerogatives, such as <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/285-afghanistan-future-national-unity-government">appointments to security posts</a>, at a time when the Taliban are making gains in the countryside. Ghani, a former World Bank specialist, is a Pashtun from the country’s south, like Karzai, but is seen by the Obama administration as a <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/07/04/ashraf-ghani-afghanistans-theorist-in-chief">welcome change</a>. Karzai had railed against civilian casualties in the U.S. war effort and was seen as fostering public corruption.</p><p>In 2015, USAID launched its largest ($280 million) gender program in the world: the Promoting Gender Equity in National Priority Programs Project, or PROMOTE. The five-year program aims to educate, train, and enable Afghan women to participate more fully in politics, civil society, and the private sector, with one of its four components being “Women in the Economy.”68</p><p>As the population tried to look past the 2014 election debacle, advocates for the private sector were encouraged by the NUG’s initial pronouncements, with President Ghani, a former World Bank official, emphasizing the need to get the economy going. In advance of the NUG’s participation in the September 2014 London Conference on Afghanistan, co-hosted by the governments of the UK and Afghanistan, President Ghani met with representatives of the Afghan private sector who presented him with a 22-point summary of issues and proposed remedies, most of which spoke of the need for increased transparency and improved governance.257 Earlier that year, the Afghan government’s report on the completed ANDS confirmed the belief that the strategy had been unrealistic and lacked direction and prioritization. The report showed that fewer than half of the targeted private sector development outcomes had been achieved, and those that had were primarily in processes, such as the “creation of legal frameworks for the trading sector, and simplification of regulations for business licenses and registration.” Planned impacts, such as “percent increase in private investment” or “percent GDP increase,” lacked baselines and targets and therefore could not be evaluated. The report also noted the marked increase in the trade deficit and the fact that domestic revenue could finance only 52 percent of the government’s operational budget, or half of what was projected in the ANDS.258 In response, the NUG decided the NPPs would be consolidated and reprioritized to reflect the new government’s priorities, including infrastructure, employment and human capital development, private sector development, and effective governance</p><p>In 2015, the security situation deteriorated significantly, with a 19 percent increase in security incidents in the south and an intensification of insecurity in the north, including the seizure of 16 district centers and, temporarily, Kunduz City, the first provincial center lost to the Taliban.261 Given this uptick in insecurity, in October 2015 the United States and its NATO allies met in Brussels for a summit in which they pledged to revise their planned troop commitments. Soon after the meeting, the United States committed to maintain its troop level at 9,800 for 2016 and retain 5,500 troops into 2017. Other NATO members followed suit by committing to maintain or, in the case of Germany, increase troop levels.262 In October 2016, 75 countries and 26 international organizations once again convened in Brussels, this time to hear the Afghan government present its latest strategy, the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework. Donors pledged a total of $15.2 billion in support of the government’s priorities until 2020.263 The strategy highlights the Afghan government’s continued efforts toward achieving self-reliance by pursuing improved governance, anticorruption, and organizational reforms.264 Acknowledging that the early reconstruction years’ high GDP growth rate was a result of foreign assistance, the Afghan government prioritized investment in agriculture, energy, and infrastructure as the main drivers of economic growth, jobs, and revenue. The need for private sector-led economic growth was reiterated by USAID’s three-year Afghanistan strategy developed in 2015. USAID continued to emphasize the need for the private sector to “become the main source of increases in government revenue to replace donor assistance and provide </p><p>Large-scale extractive efforts, which especially in recent years had been assigned a major role in Afghanistan’s future, largely stalled due to insecurity, including in the Aynak mine region. The U.S. and Afghan governments continued to emphasize improving legislative and regulatory frameworks to encourage private sector investment in extractives, with USAID supporting the sector through the MIDAS project, which ended in early 2017. However, amending the mining law to make it more friendly to business and resistant to corrupt or illegal practices, one of the main indicators of the Afghan government’s commitment to progress in the sector, remained a source of contention between MOMP, the parliament, and the executive offices.267 On a positive note, in July 2016 Afghanistan officially became a full member of the WTO, an achievement highlighted by both the Afghan and U.S. governments. At the end of 2017, with increased Taliban attacks, the growing presence of the Islamic State, and no visible progress toward a political settlement, uncertainty was even more widespread than in previous years, and the economic outlook in Afghanistan was discouraging. As the USAID transition plan for 2015–2018 noted, “Despite recent regulatory improvements and increased access to finance, the business-enabling environment in Afghanistan is one of the worst in the world.”268 It is no surprise that in its 2017 Ease of Doing Business rankings, the World Bank ranked Afghanistan 183 of 190 countries, six spots lower than its rank in 2016.269</p><p>In 2016, after years of negotiations, India, Iran, and Afghanistan signed a trilateral agreement through which India would invest in further developing Iran’s Chabahar port. The expanded port was inaugurated at the end of 2017, allowing India to trade more easily with Afghanistan and bypass the Pakistani port of Karach</p><p>Afghanistan’s official entrance into the WTO on July 29, 2016, was the culmination of a process that began in 2003. Under USAID’s AEGP project, an inter-ministerial group was created to hold preliminary talks with the WTO. However, because of complications in the division of tasks between MOFA and MOCI, the process was delayed. After Afghanistan gained WTO observer status in December 2004, accession was given additional support by the EGPSS program, which included in its goals the achievement of the milestones required for full WTO membership. While the TAFA programs primarily supported WTO accession through increasing trade liberalization and regional integration, the ATAR program specifically prioritized WTO accession because, by 2013, formal negotiations and meetings of the WTO working party had already begun.</p><p>In his final State of the Union address in 2016, President Obama noted, “In today’s world, we’re threatened less by evil empires and more by failing states.”7 </p><p>In the second half of 2017, Afghanistan’s trade with Pakistan was reported to have fallen substantially, while trade with Iran and India grew.7</p><p><em>August 21, 2017</em>Trump Signals Prolonged Afghan War President Trump <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/world/asia/trump-speech-afghanistan.html">outlines his Afghanistan policy</a> in an address to troops in Arlington, VA, saying that though his “original instinct was to pull out,” he will instead press ahead with an open-ended military commitment to prevent the emergence of “a vacuum for terrorists.” Differentiating his policy from Obama’s, Trump says decisions about withdrawal will be based on “conditions on the ground,” rather than arbitrary timelines. He invites India to play a greater role in rebuilding Afghanistan while castigating Pakistan for harboring insurgents. He also pledges to loosen restrictions on combat even as the United Nations <a href="https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/protection_of_civilians_in_armed_conflict_midyear_report_2017_july_2017.pdf">reports an uptick</a> [PDF] in civilian casualties caused by Afghan and coalition air strikes. A political settlement with the Taliban, Trump says, is far off.</p><p>The Afghan government envisions the country functioning as a data and telecommunications transit hub for Central Asia, a digital analogue of the Silk Road. In 2017, the government was closing out a project to establish a fiber optic ring network along the Ring Road, called the Optic Fiber Cable Backbone Ring Project</p><p><em>January 2018</em>Taliban Launches Major Attacks Amid U.S. Escalation The Taliban carry out a series of bold terror attacks in Kabul that kill more than 115 people amid a broader upsurge in violence. The attacks come as the Trump administration implements its Afghanistan plan, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/world/asia/afghanistan-army-trainers.html">deploying troops across rural Afghanistan</a> to advise Afghan brigades and launching <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/afghanistans-poppy-boom-isnt-all-talibans-fault">air strikes against opium labs</a> to try to decimate the Taliban’s finances. The administration also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/world/asia/pakistan-aid-afghan-war.html">cuts off security assistance</a> worth billions of dollars to Pakistan for what President Trump called its “lies and deceit” in harboring Taliban militants. Critics of the National Unity Government say domestic politics—notably a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-governor-atta-noor/stand-off-over-powerful-afghan-governor-foreshadows-bitter-election-fight-idUSKBN1EW07N">showdown with a provincial governor</a>—have distracted President Ghani from security.</p><p><em>February 2019</em>U.S.-Taliban Peace Talks Progress Negotiations between the United States and the Taliban in Doha <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/24/world/asia/taliban-negotiator-afghanistan-qatar-us.html?module=inline">enter their highest level yet</a>, building on momentum that began in late 2018. The talks between U.S. special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and top Taliban official Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar center on the United States withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan in exchange for the Taliban pledging to block international terrorist groups from operating on Afghan soil. The ramped-up diplomacy follows signals that President Trump plans to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/us/politics/afghanistan-troop-withdrawal.html">pull out seven thousand troops</a>, about half the total U.S. deployment. Khalilzad says the United States will insist that the Taliban agree to participate in an <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/interpreting-us-talks-taliban">intra-Afghan dialogue</a> on the country’s political structure, as well as a cease-fire. It is unclear whether Trump will condition the troop withdrawal on those terms.</p><p><em>September 7, 2019</em>Trump Calls Off Peace Talks President Trump abruptly breaks off peace talks a week after top U.S. negotiator Khalilzad announced that an <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/02/politics/us-afghanistan-agreement-in-principle/index.html">agreement had been reached “in principle”</a> with Taliban leaders. In a tweet, Trump says he canceled a secret meeting with the Taliban and Afghan President Ghani at Camp David after a U.S. soldier was killed in a Taliban attack. The Taliban says it’s “<a href="https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/taliban-%E2%80%98committed-talks%E2%80%99-if-political-settlement-continues">committed to continuing negotiations</a>,” but warns that the cancellation will cause an increase in the number of deaths.</p><p><em>September 7, 2019</em>Trump Calls Off Peace Talks President Trump abruptly breaks off peace talks a week after top U.S. negotiator Khalilzad announced that an <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/02/politics/us-afghanistan-agreement-in-principle/index.html">agreement had been reached “in principle”</a> with Taliban leaders. In a tweet, Trump says he canceled a secret meeting with the Taliban and Afghan President Ghani at Camp David after a U.S. soldier was killed in a Taliban attack. The Taliban says it’s “<a href="https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/taliban-%E2%80%98committed-talks%E2%80%99-if-political-settlement-continues">committed to continuing negotiations</a>,” but warns that the cancellation will cause an increase in the number of deaths.</p><p><em>September 12, 2020</em>Intra-Afghan Peace Talks Begin Representatives of the Taliban and of the Afghan government and civil society meet face to face for the first time in Doha, Qatar, after nearly twenty years of war. The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/what-know-about-afghan-peace-negotiations">direct negotiations</a>, which were delayed for months over a prisoner swap proposed in the earlier U.S.-Taliban deal, begin after the Afghan government completes the release of five thousand Taliban prisoners. During <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/09/peace-afghan-gov-taliban-arrive-talks-200911143549952.html">opening remarks</a>, both sides express eagerness to bring peace to Afghanistan and establish a framework for Afghan society after U.S. troops withdraw. The government pushes for a cease-fire, while the Taliban reiterates its call for the country to be governed through an Islamic system. </p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p>No children (leaf entity)