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- 11569
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- No! for his having had the insolence to appeal from an authority, in
maintaining which the men who tried and condemned him had so strong a
sympathetic interest.
Whether this story be wholly true or not, or whether the particular law
involved prevails, or ever did prevail, in the English Navy, the thing,
nevertheless, illustrates the ideas that man-of-war’s-men themselves
have touching the tribunals in question.
What can be expected from a court whose deeds are done in the darkness
of the recluse courts of the Spanish Inquisition? when that darkness is
solemnised by an oath on the Bible? when an oligarchy of epaulets sits
upon the bench, and a plebeian top-man, without a jury, stands
judicially naked at the bar?
In view of these things, and especially in view of the fact that, in
several cases, the degree of punishment inflicted upon a
man-of-war’s-man is absolutely left to the discretion of the court,
what shame should American legislators take to themselves, that with
perfect truth we may apply to the entire body of the American
man-of-war’s-men that infallible principle of Sir Edward Coke: “It is
one of the genuine marks of servitude to have the law either concealed
or precarious.” But still better may we subscribe to the saying of Sir
Matthew Hale in his History of the Common Law, that “the Martial Law,
being based upon no settled principles, is, in truth and reality, no
law, but something indulged rather than allowed as a law.”
I know it may be said that the whole nature of this naval code is
purposely adapted to the war exigencies of the Navy. But waiving the
grave question that might be raised concerning the moral, not judicial,
lawfulness of this arbitrary code, even in time of war; be it asked,
why it is in force during a time of peace? The United States has now
existed as a nation upward of seventy years, and in all that time the
alleged necessity for the operation of the naval code—in cases deemed
capital—has only existed during a period of two or three years at most.
Some may urge that the severest operations of the code are tacitly made
null in time of peace. But though with respect to several of the
Articles this holds true, yet at any time any and all of them may be
legally enforced. Nor have there been wanting recent instances,
illustrating the spirit of this code, even in cases where the letter of
the code was not altogether observed. The well-known case of a United
States brig furnishes a memorable example, which at any moment may be
repeated. Three men, in a time of peace, were then hung at the
yard-arm, merely because, in the Captain’s judgment, it became
necessary to hang them. To this day the question of their complete
guilt is socially discussed.
How shall we characterise such a deed? Says Blackstone, “If any one
that hath commission of martial authority doth, in time of peace, hang,
or otherwise execute any man by colour of martial law, this is murder;
for it is against Magna Charta.”* [* Commentaries, b. i., c. xiii.]
Magna Charta! We moderns, who may be landsmen, may justly boast of
civil immunities not possessed by our forefathers; but our remoter
forefathers who happened to be mariners may straighten themselves even
in their ashes to think that their lawgivers were wiser and more humane
in their generation than our lawgivers in ours. Compare the sea-laws of
our Navy with the Roman and Rhodian ocean ordinances; compare them with
the “Consulate of the Sea;” compare them with the Laws of the Hanse
Towns; compare them with the ancient Wisbury laws. In the last we find
that they were ocean democrats in those days. “If he strikes, he ought
to receive blow for blow.” Thus speak out the Wisbury laws concerning a
Gothland sea-captain.
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