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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C02000171 problem out of the congressional election campaign during the next two months, fearing a further swing to the left if emotions are raised over the Castro issue. Demonstrations by pro-Castro groups protesting the US break with Cuba--in Uruguay, El Salvador, and Panama thus far--have been relatively ineffective, a fact that may encourage some regimes that have been reluctant to support anti-Castro moves for fear of strong domestic reaction. Argentina, which has been the sharpest critic of Cuba among the major Latin American countries, would probably support economic sanctions against Cuba but would be reluctant to break diplomatic relations at this time for both hemisphere and internal security reasons. The government believes it should maintain a listening post in Cuba, where a number of important Peronista leaders reside, and Cuban opposition leaders have requested Argentina to maintain its embassy in order to furnish assistance to these seeking asylum. The foreign minister has said that relations with Cuba could definitely not be severed before the 5 February local and senate elections. The Cuban situation is not now on the agenda for the Inter-American Conference, which was prepared some time ago. What Uruguay is seeking to enlarge the agenda to include "Communist penetration of America." Some governments, on the other hand, are giving thought to convening a special foreign ministers' meeting to deal with Cuba, and Panamanian Foreign Minister Solis told Ambassador Farland on 4 January that Panama would be happy to host such a conference. The US break in relations coincided with intensive preparations within Cuba to resist "imminent aggression" and with a drastic tightening of police state controls, leaving the majority 10 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C02000171
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