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- confessions
- text
- no, move not so far as I had come from the house to that place where we
were sitting. For, not to go only, but to go in thither was nothing else
but to will to go, but to will resolutely and thoroughly; not to turn
and toss, this way and that, a maimed and half-divided will, struggling,
with one part sinking as another rose.
Lastly, in the very fever of my irresoluteness, I made with my body many
such motions as men sometimes would, but cannot, if either they have not
the limbs, or these be bound with bands, weakened with infirmity, or
any other way hindered. Thus, if I tore my hair, beat my forehead, if
locking my fingers I clasped my knee; I willed, I did it. But I might
have willed, and not done it; if the power of motion in my limbs had not
obeyed. So many things then I did, when "to will" was not in itself "to
be able"; and I did not what both I longed incomparably more to do, and
which soon after, when I should will, I should be able to do; because
soon after, when I should will, I should will thoroughly. For in these
things the ability was one with the will, and to will was to do; and yet
was it not done: and more easily did my body obey the weakest willing of
my soul, in moving its limbs at its nod, than the soul obeyed itself to
accomplish in the will alone this its momentous will.
Whence is this monstrousness? and to what end? Let Thy mercy gleam that
I may ask, if so be the secret penalties of men, and those darkest
pangs of the sons of Adam, may perhaps answer me. Whence is this
monstrousness? and to what end? The mind commands the body, and it obeys
instantly; the mind commands itself, and is resisted. The mind commands
the hand to be moved; and such readiness is there, that command is
scarce distinct from obedience. Yet the mind is mind, the hand is body.
The mind commands the mind, its own self, to will, and yet it doth not.
Whence this monstrousness? and to what end? It commands itself, I say,
to will, and would not command, unless it willed, and what it commands
is not done. But it willeth not entirely: therefore doth it not command
entirely. For so far forth it commandeth, as it willeth: and, so far
forth is the thing commanded, not done, as it willeth not. For the will
commandeth that there be a will; not another, but itself. But it doth
not command entirely, therefore what it commandeth, is not. For were
the will entire, it would not even command it to be, because it would
already be. It is therefore no monstrousness partly to will, partly to
nill, but a disease of the mind, that it doth not wholly rise, by truth
upborne, borne down by custom. And therefore are there two wills, for
that one of them is not entire: and what the one lacketh, the other
hath.
Let them perish from Thy presence, O God, as perish vain talkers and
seducers of the soul: who observing that in deliberating there were two
wills, affirm that there are two minds in us of two kinds, one good, the
other evil. Themselves are truly evil, when they hold these evil things;
and themselves shall become good when they hold the truth and assent
unto the truth, that Thy Apostle may say to them, Ye were sometimes
darkness, but now light in the Lord. But they, wishing to be light, not
in the Lord, but in themselves, imagining the nature of the soul to
be that which God is, are made more gross darkness through a dreadful
arrogancy; for that they went back farther from Thee, the true Light
that enlightened every man that cometh into the world. Take heed what
you say, and blush for shame: draw near unto Him and be enlightened,
and your faces shall not be ashamed. Myself when I was deliberating
upon serving the Lord my God now, as I had long purposed, it was I who
willed, I who nilled, I, I myself. I neither willed entirely, nor nilled
entirely. Therefore was I at strife with myself, and rent asunder by
myself. And this rent befell me against my will, and yet indicated, not
the presence of another mind, but the punishment of my own. Therefore it
was no more I that wrought it, but sin that dwelt in me; the punishment
of a sin more freely committed, in that I was a son of Adam.
For if there be so many contrary natures as there be conflicting wills,
there shall now be not two only, but many. If a man deliberate whether
he should go to their conventicle or to the theatre, these Manichees
cry out, Behold, here are two natures: one good, draws this way; another
bad, draws back that way. For whence else is this hesitation between
conflicting wills? But I say that both be bad: that which draws to them,
as that which draws back to the theatre. But they believe not that
will to be other than good, which draws to them. What then if one of us
should deliberate, and amid the strife of his two wills be in a strait,
whether he should go to the theatre or to our church? would not these
Manichees also be in a strait what to answer? For either they must
confess (which they fain would not) that the will which leads to our
church is good, as well as theirs, who have received and are held by the
mysteries of theirs: or they must suppose two evil natures, and two evil
souls conflicting in one man, and it will not be true, which they say,
that there is one good and another bad; or they must be converted to the
truth, and no more deny that where one deliberates, one soul fluctuates
between contrary wills.
Let them no more say then, when they perceive two conflicting wills
in one man, that the conflict is between two contrary souls, of two
contrary substances, from two contrary principles, one good, and the
other bad. For Thou, O true God, dost disprove, check, and convict them;
as when, both wills being bad, one deliberates whether he should kill
a man by poison or by the sword; whether he should seize this or that
estate of another's, when he cannot both; whether he should purchase
pleasure by luxury, or keep his money by covetousness; whether he go to
the circus or the theatre, if both be open on one day; or thirdly, to
rob another's house, if he have the opportunity; or, fourthly, to commit
adultery, if at the same time he have the means thereof also; all these
meeting together in the same juncture of time, and all being equally
desired, which cannot at one time be acted: for they rend the mind
amid four, or even (amid the vast variety of things desired) more,
conflicting wills, nor do they yet allege that there are so many divers
substances. So also in wills which are good. For I ask them, is it good
to take pleasure in reading the Apostle? or good to take pleasure in
a sober Psalm? or good to discourse on the Gospel? They will answer to
each, "it is good." What then if all give equal pleasure, and all at
once? Do not divers wills distract the mind, while he deliberates which
he should rather choose? yet are they all good, and are at variance till
one be chosen, whither the one entire will may be borne, which before
was divided into many. Thus also, when, above, eternity delights us, and
the pleasure of temporal good holds us down below, it is the same soul
which willeth not this or that with an entire will; and therefore is
rent asunder with grievous perplexities, while out of truth it sets this
first, but out of habit sets not that aside.
Thus soul-sick was I, and tormented, accusing myself much more severely
than my wont, rolling and turning me in my chain, till that were wholly
broken, whereby I now was but just, but still was, held. And Thou, O
Lord, pressedst upon me in my inward parts by a severe mercy, redoubling
the lashes of fear and shame, lest I should again give way, and not
bursting that same slight remaining tie, it should recover strength, and
bind me the faster.